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of harm is real and the threatened harm is imminent. This Article challenges
that doctrine. It argues that Article III does not create a threshold of risk for
potential harms. Contrary to the Court’s view, imposing such a threshold
actually undermines the powers of both the courts and Congress. It also
results in incoherent and unpredictable decisions because difficulties in
applying the doctrine lead courts to base their decisions not on the actual
likelihood of injury, but instead on other considerations, such as separation
of powers and the fitness of the case for review. Nevertheless, recognizing
that there may be reasons not to adjudicate particular claims alleging small
risks of harm, this Article recommends that courts develop a prudential
doctrine under which they may abstain from hearing such claims. Replacing
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INTRODUCTION
Courts cannot decide legal questions in the abstract based on
hypothetical disputes.1 As the Supreme Court has told us, the case-orcontroversy requirement of Article III limits the federal judiciary to
resolving legal questions only in the context of redressing or preventing an
“actual” or threatened injury resulting from violations of the law.2 To hear

1
See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 341 (2006) (“If a dispute is not a proper case or
controversy, the courts have no business deciding it, or expounding the law in the course of doing so.”);
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240–41 (1937) (“The controversy must be definite and
concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests.”). The Supreme Court has
also said that Article III imposes other limitations, such as a requirement that the dispute must be of the
sort traditionally heard by the courts. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 102
(1998); GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumers Union, Inc., 445 U.S. 375, 382 (1980) (stating that federal
courts may resolve legal questions only when “presented in an adversary context and in a form
historically viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial process” (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392
U.S. 83, 95 (1968)) (internal quotation mark omitted)).
2
Alvarez v. Smith, 130 S. Ct. 576, 580 (2009) (“The Constitution permits this Court to decide legal
questions only in the context of actual ‘Cases’ or ‘Controversies.’” (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2));
Cuno, 547 U.S. at 341 (“[N]o principle is more fundamental to the judiciary’s proper role in our system
of government than the constitutional limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases or
controversies.” (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted));
see also Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 492 (2009) (stating that “courts have no charter to
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claims based merely on a hypothetical, the Court has explained, would
unduly expand the judiciary’s role by empowering it to address questions
more properly reserved for the legislature or executive.3
The concern about overexpansive federal judicial power has led to
restrictions on jurisdiction over claims seeking prospective relief from
threatened harms that have not yet taken place. Threatened future injuries
are probabilistic; they might not occur. Based on the fear that recognizing
jurisdiction for all injuries that have some probability of occurring—
however small—would effectively empower courts to hear hypothetical
disputes, the Supreme Court has held that Article III authorizes federal
courts to hear claims alleging future injury only when the threatened injury
has a real chance of occurring.4 When the threat of injury is too speculative,
that threat does not present a justiciable case under Article III.
The Court has enforced this limitation through the doctrine of
standing.5 To establish Article III standing in a suit brought to prevent a
future injury, plaintiffs must demonstrate that they face a “real and
immediate” threat of suffering an injury in fact because of the defendant’s
conduct.6
Although seemingly simple on its face, this doctrine has proven
difficult to apply and has provoked substantial scholarly commentary.7 Over
the years, determining when a claim is too remote or speculative to support
standing has occupied substantial attention of the Supreme Court, perhaps
review and revise legislative and executive action” except “when necessary in the execution of”
deciding justiciable disputes).
3
See Cuno, 547 U.S. at 341 (stating that if courts could address all legal questions under the
Constitution, “[t]he division of power [among the branches of government] could exist no longer, and
the other departments would be swallowed up by the judiciary” (alterations in original) (quoting John
Marshall, Speech Delivered in the House of Representatives of the United States on the Resolutions of
the Hon. Edward Livingston (Mar. 7, 1800), in 4 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 82, 95 (Charles T.
Cullen ed., 1984)) (internal quotation mark omitted)).
4
See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102–06 (1983).
5
See Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1814 (2010) (“To demonstrate standing, a plaintiff must
have ‘alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to warrant his invocation of
federal-court jurisdiction.’” (quoting Horne v. Flores, 129 S. Ct. 2579, 2592 (2009))). In some older
decisions, the Court relied on the restriction on advisory opinions. See United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell,
330 U.S. 75, 89–91 (1947).
6
O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974) (internal quotation marks omitted).
7
See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Linkage Between Justiciability and Remedies—And Their
Connections to Substantive Rights, 92 VA. L. REV. 633, 698 (2006) (supporting a qualitative approach to
assessing the substantiality of risk for standing); Jonathan Remy Nash, Standing and the Precautionary
Principle, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 494, 511–15 (2008) (advocating for the incorporation of the
precautionary principle into standing doctrine, under which states would have standing to sue for
uncertain risks of potentially catastrophic and irreversible injury); Cass R. Sunstein, Standing Injuries,
1993 SUP. CT. REV. 37, 46–50 (criticizing the Court’s approach to standing in cases alleging a risk of
future harm); see also Amanda Leiter, Substance or Illusion? The Dangers of Imposing a Standing
Threshold, 97 GEO. L.J. 391 (2009) (criticizing the D.C. Circuit’s particularly high threshold on risk for
standing as immoral and not compelled by doctrine).

57

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

more attention than any other question of justiciability.8 Despite these
decisions, there continues to be uncertainty about when a threatened injury
is justiciable. Courts disagree about the necessary threshold of risk for
justiciability.9 They also often lack the information necessary to determine
the probability of injury, forcing them to render decisions based on
guesses—guesses that are assuredly influenced by personal biases and other
concerns such as separation of powers and federalism. Scholars have
responded by offering proposals ranging from limiting the probability
threshold only to cases involving private plaintiffs10 to adopting a more
flexible approach that considers not only the probability of harm but also
the severity of the harm.11
This Article offers a different solution. It argues that the difficulties
associated with the threshold of risk necessary for standing need not
encumber the doctrine of standing because Article III does not impose a
minimum-risk requirement. For hundreds of years, courts have had the
power to award prospective relief, such as an injunction, to prevent future
injuries. Yet all future injuries addressed by prospective orders have some
chance of not occurring. Claims to prevent these injuries are nevertheless
justiciable because awarding judicial relief will have the real-world effect of
reducing the risk of injury. A plaintiff who faces a small threat of injury
likewise has a real interest in reducing that risk of injury. The plaintiff’s
interest is no less real than the interest held by an individual in avoiding a
threatened injury that is extremely likely to occur. The only difference is
that the plaintiff’s stake is smaller. The plaintiff’s claim therefore presents a
case under Article III.
Of course, even though a risk of small harm presents a justiciable case,
there may still be reasons for a court not to intervene in a particular case
involving a small risk. For example, a plaintiff may face a small risk of
injury because there is a significant chance that the political branches will
intervene to prevent the harm from occurring. In that situation, respect for
the other branches might counsel courts to abstain from exercising that

8

See, e.g., Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 492–97 (2009); Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S.
724, 734–35 (2008); Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 521–23 (2007); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.
Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181–84 (2000); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 563–64 (1992); Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 157 (1990); Diamond v. Charles, 476
U.S. 54, 66 (1986); Lyons, 461 U.S. at 105; Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289,
298–99 (1979); Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U.S. 171, 172 & n.2 (1977); Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights
Org., 426 U.S. 26, 40–44 (1976); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371–73 (1976); O’Shea, 414 U.S. at
494.
9
Compare, e.g., Vill. of Elk Grove Vill. v. Evans, 997 F.2d 328, 329 (7th Cir. 1993) (“[E]ven a
small probability of injury is sufficient to create a case or controversy . . . .”), with Sierra Club v. EPA,
292 F.3d 895, 899 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (requiring a “substantial probability” of injury (quoting Am.
Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 216 F.3d 50, 63 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted))).
10
See Nash, supra note 7, at 498–99.
11
See Fallon, supra note 7, at 698.
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jurisdiction. But that decision not to exercise jurisdiction should not rest on
the lack of a case under Article III; instead, it should depend on prudential
principles of abstention.
The Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I begins by providing an
overview of standing and the case-or-controversy clause of Article III. It
then describes the current doctrines restricting standing for plaintiffs
seeking prospective relief. Part II explains why threats of injury, no matter
how small or remote, present a case or controversy. It also points out the
problems, doctrinal and otherwise, that arise from limiting standing based
on future injury to only those plaintiffs alleging a substantial risk of harm.
Part III responds to historical objections and other concerns, such as the
threat of overwhelming the federal dockets, arising from reading Article III
to encompass any threat of harm.
The logical upshot of Parts II and III is that standing should extend to
all claims involving a risk of future injury. But recognizing that there may
nevertheless be reasons for courts to refuse to hear some claims involving
small risks of injury, Part IV offers a framework for cabining the federal
judiciary’s ability to hear claims involving future injury. It explains that,
although Article III extends the judicial power over claims alleging a small
risk of injury, federal courts should develop a prudential doctrine under
which they may refuse to exercise jurisdiction over such claims. In
exercising this permissive authority, courts should consider multiple
factors, such as the need for judicial review, the quality of decisionmaking,
separation of powers, and federalism. This prudential test would be superior
to current doctrine not only because it does not rely on a flawed Article III
doctrine that implicitly obscures so many different theoretical and practical
considerations, but also because it would increase the legitimacy of judicial
decisions by promoting transparency. It would also clarify the law and
result in decisions that more accurately implement the considerations
leading courts to deny jurisdiction in cases alleging a low risk of injury.
I.

THE CURRENT DOCTRINE OF STANDING

A. Article III Standing
Article III of the Constitution extends the federal judicial power to
resolving “Cases” or “Controversies.”12 The Supreme Court has explained
that this clause does not empower federal courts to resolve all disputes.
Instead, the dispute must be “of a Judiciary [N]ature”13—that is, it must be
capable of resolution by a judicial order imposing a specific form of relief
through an “an immediate and definitive determination of the legal rights of
12

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 (2006) (quoting 2 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 430 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966)).
13
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the parties.”14 According to the Supreme Court, this restriction on the power
of the federal judiciary is fundamental to maintaining the appropriate
separation of powers.15 By permitting the courts to pass on legal questions
only in the context of resolving disputes, this doctrine ensures that courts do
not usurp the role of the political branches to set policy and define legal
obligations and rights.16
The principal doctrine employed by the courts to enforce the limits of
Article III is standing. For plaintiffs to have standing to bring suit in federal
court, they must demonstrate that they have suffered, or are about to suffer,
an “injury in fact,” which has been broadly defined to include injuries not
only to economic and physical interests but also to spiritual and aesthetic
interests.17 A plaintiff must also show that this factual injury is “fairly
traceable” to the actions of the defendant, and that it “will likely be
redressed by a favorable decision.”18 In the Court’s view, these
requirements are necessary conditions for the existence of an actual

14
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 241 (1937); accord David P. Currie,
Misunderstanding Standing, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 41, 41–47; see also MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech,
Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007) (noting that to be justiciable, the dispute must “admi[t] of specific relief
through a decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law
would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.” (alteration in original) (quoting Haworth, 300 U.S. at 241)
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975) (“[T]he standing
question . . . is whether the constitutional or statutory provision on which the claim rests properly can be
understood as granting persons in the plaintiff’s position a right to judicial relief.”).
15
See Cuno, 547 U.S. at 341 (“[N]o principle is more fundamental to the judiciary’s proper role in
our system of government than the constitutional limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases
or controversies.” (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
16
See id. at 340–41; see also Marshall, supra note 3, at 95 (“If the judicial power extended to every
question under the constitution it would involve almost every subject proper for legislative discussion
and decision; if to every question under the laws and treaties of the United States it would involve
almost every subject on which the executive could act. The division of power [among the branches of
government], could exist no longer, and the other departments would be swallowed up by the
judiciary.”).
17
Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152, 154 (1970). Courts and
commentators have disagreed over the kinds of injuries that should suffice for standing. Some have
argued that a violation of rights should suffice for standing, see, e.g., Zivotofsky ex rel. Ari Z. v. Sec’y
of State, 444 F.3d 614, 619 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“[A] concrete and particular injury for standing purposes
can . . . consist of the violation of an individual right conferred on a person by statute.”); F. Andrew
Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 275, 324 (2008), while
others have contended that standing should turn on whether the plaintiff suffered any consequences from
the violation of the right, see, e.g., Doe v. Nat’l Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 199 F.3d 146, 153 (3d Cir. 1999)
(“The proper analysis of standing focuses on whether the plaintiff suffered an actual injury, not on
whether a statute was violated.”); John G. Roberts, Jr., Article III Limits on Statutory Standing, 42 DUKE
L.J. 1219, 1220 (1993). It is unnecessary to resolve that dispute in this paper, which addresses the
requirement that the injury for standing—whatever it may be—be nonspeculative and imminent.
18
Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997); accord Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488,
493 (2009); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180–81
(2000); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
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controversy by limiting jurisdiction to disputes in which the plaintiff has a
direct stake in the litigation.19 Individuals may resort to the federal courts
only to remedy their personal injuries; they cannot go to the courts simply
to pursue a policy agenda.20
B. Standing in Cases Alleging Future Injuries
Standing in federal courts is not limited to claims for retrospective
relief like damages. Article III empowers the federal judiciary to hear cases
in “[e]quity,”21 which encompasses requests for prospective injunctions.22
There is an unbroken historical practice of federal courts exercising
jurisdiction over claims for prospective relief to prevent threatened injuries
that have not yet occurred.23
But the Court has not extended Article III jurisdiction over all claims
of threatened future injuries. Out of concern that recognizing the
justiciability of all such injuries would unduly expand the power of the
federal courts to resolve legal issues, it has limited the type of future
injuries that suffice for standing.24 The Court has held that for a plaintiff to
have standing, the threat of injury must be “real.”25 This Article calls this
the “minimum-risk requirement.” Relying on this requirement, the Court
has not hesitated to exercise its power to grant injunctions to prevent
threatened injuries that are likely to occur.26 But when the threat of injury is

19

See Summers, 555 U.S. at 493 (noting that standing ensures that the plaintiff has “‘alleged such a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy’ as to warrant his invocation of federal-court
jurisdiction” (quoting Warth, 422 U.S. at 498–99 (internal quotation mark omitted)).
20
See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576.
21
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and
Equity . . . .”).
22
See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual
Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 154–58 (1998) (documenting the early American history of
copyright injunctions); Daniel J. Walker, Note, Administrative Injunctions: Assessing the Propriety of
*on-Class Collective Relief, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1119, 1129–32 (2005) (documenting the early history
of injunctions in America).
23
See, e.g., Vicksburg Waterworks Co. v. Vicksburg, 185 U.S. 65, 82 (1902) (holding that a
“threatened” injury from illegal activity presented an actual case); see also Valley Forge Christian Coll.
v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (recognizing standing
for a party who “personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury” (quoting Gladstone, Realtors
v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979))).
24
See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61.
25
E.g., Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990); City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S.
95, 101 (1983); Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 109–10 (1969); United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell,
330 U.S. 75, 89–91 (1947); see also Md. Cas. Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941)
(requiring a “substantial controversy”).
26
See Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U.S. 352, 366–68 (1980) (finding standing for workers to challenge
refusal to apply law where application of law would have increased the likelihood that land would be
available for sale at a low price).
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too low, the Court has said, the dispute is merely “hypothetical” and is
consequently insufficient to support standing.27
Whitmore v. Arkansas28 provides an example of this minimum-risk
requirement. Whitmore, an Arkansas inmate who had been sentenced to
death, sought to intervene in an Arkansas state action to challenge the
imposition of the death penalty on another inmate, Ronald Simmons.29
According to Whitmore, although Simmons opted not to appeal his death
sentence, the Eighth Amendment required the state to conduct appellate
review before imposing the death penalty.30 Whitmore explained that he had
an interest in intervening because, if Simmons’s death sentence were
overturned, that decision might provide a state law basis for Whitmore to
challenge his own death sentence before the Arkansas Supreme Court31—
not on direct appeal, because Whitmore’s appeals had been exhausted, but
instead in a subsequent case if Whitmore were granted habeas relief and
then retried, convicted, and resentenced to death.32 The Supreme Court
dismissed the case for lack of standing.33 It explained that the injury that
Whitmore claimed—an increased possibility that he would be executed if
Arkansas did not review Simmons’s sentence—was “too speculative to
invoke the jurisdiction of an Art. III court.”34 The Court reasoned that, even
if the state had reviewed Simmons’s case, Whitmore would still face the
hurdles of obtaining habeas relief, being subsequently resentenced to death,
and then convincing the Arkansas Supreme Court that Simmons’s case
should affect the outcome in Whitmore’s case.35

27

Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560; see Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 66 (1986) (rejecting standing based
on “unadorned speculation”); Lyons, 461 U.S. at 105 (denying standing to an individual seeking to
challenge police chokehold because it was only speculative that the plaintiff would be subjected to
chokehold); Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U.S. 171, 171–72 & n.2 (1977) (denying standing in a claim
challenging police use of deadly force against a person attempting to escape arrest); O’Shea v. Littleton,
414 U.S. 488, 497 (1974) (denying standing to residents who sought injunctive relief against judges
allegedly engaged in a pattern and practice of discriminatory practices on the ground that the threat to
plaintiffs from this discrimination was only “speculation and conjecture”); Golden, 394 U.S. at 109
(denying standing for a claim based on the potential future candidacy of a former Congressman);
Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 89–91 (stating that a “hypothetical threat [of enforcement] is not enough” for
jurisdiction); see also Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 489 F.3d 1279, 1294
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (denying standing for claim of speculative future injury), modified on reh’g by 513
F.3d 234 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (per curiam).
28
495 U.S. 149.
29
Id. at 153.
30
Id. at 153–54.
31
Under Arkansas law, the Arkansas Supreme Court assessed the propriety of death sentences by
comparing them to other death sentences. See id. at 156–57.
32
Id. at 156.
33
Id. at 166.
34
Id. at 157.
35
Id.
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This requirement of a sufficiently likely threat of injury frequently
arises in challenges to administrative actions. Individuals often challenge
government regulation that they perceive as too lax, basing standing on the
claim that a more stringent regulation would further decrease the risk that
they would suffer harm from the regulated activity. Frequently, however,
the marginal increase in risk from the less stringent regulation is small. For
example, in Sierra Club v. EPA, environmental groups challenged a
regulation on the storage and disposal of hazardous sludge.36 To establish
standing, the group argued that some of its members lived and worked near
facilities that, under the regulation, could be used for the production and
storage of the sludge, and that the proximity to those facilities could result
in injury.37 The D.C. Circuit denied standing, explaining that the challengers
had not established a sufficient likelihood of injury from the permitted
production and disposal.38
In addition to requiring that a threat be “real,” courts have held that
standing is appropriate only when the threatened risk is “imminent.”39 This
imminence requirement also appears in the doctrine of ripeness. Unlike
standing, which limits who can bring suit, ripeness defines when a person
may bring suit.40 The ripeness requirement prohibits federal courts from
36

292 F.3d 895, 896–97 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
Id. at 901.
38
Id. at 902; see also NRDC v. EPA, 440 F.3d 476, 481–84 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (holding that a risk of
1 in 4.2 billion is insufficiently substantial to support standing), overruled on other grounds by 464 F.3d
1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Ctr. for Law & Educ. v. Dep’t of Educ., 396 F.3d 1152, 1161 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(denying standing to a plaintiff who failed to establish a “demonstrably increased risk” from a
challenged regulation (quoting Fla. Audubon Soc’y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 667) (internal quotation
marks omitted)). Professor Leiter has argued that this risk threshold for standing is unique to the D.C.
Circuit. See Leiter, supra note 7, at 404. But the Supreme Court has held that not all risks suffice for
standing, instead requiring that the risk be “real.” See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101–
02 (1983) (internal quotation mark omitted). And several circuits other than the D.C. Circuit have
likewise imposed a heightened risk threshold. See Stewart v. Blackwell, 444 F.3d 843, 855 (6th Cir.
2006) (stating that an increased risk of harm suffices for standing, so long as the risk is “neither
speculative nor remote”), superseded by 473 F.3d 692, 694 (6th Cir. 2007) (en banc); Paul Revere
Variable Annuity Ins. Co. v. Kirschhofer, 226 F.3d 15, 24 (1st Cir. 2000) (requiring a “realistic risk of
significant harm” for standing); see also Cent. Delta Water Agency v. United States, 306 F.3d 938, 950
(9th Cir. 2002) (requiring a “credible threat of harm” to support standing); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.
Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 159 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (noting that low risks
because of a lack of imminence do not suffice for standing). That said, some circuits have rejected a
minimum threshold of risk for standing despite the Supreme Court’s holding. See Baur v. Veneman, 352
F.3d 625, 634 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding standing based on the “enhanced risk” from exposure to
“potentially harmful products”); Vill. of Elk Grove Vill. v. Evans, 997 F.2d 328, 329 (7th Cir. 1993)
(“[E]ven a small probability of injury is sufficient to create a case or controversy . . . .”).
39
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (quoting Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 155);
see also O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974) (requiring the risk to be “immediate” (quoting
Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 109 (1969)) (internal quotation mark omitted)); Massachusetts v.
Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923) (requiring the plaintiff to show “that he has sustained or is
immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury”).
40
See Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Ripeness and the Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 160–62 (1987).
37
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hearing cases prematurely.41 Like standing, ripeness implements Article
III’s limitations on the judicial power.42 The chief requirement of ripeness is
that plaintiffs may invoke federal jurisdiction only if they are so in danger
of suffering an injury as to require immediate judicial relief.43 The Court has
explained that this hardship inquiry is identical to the imminence
requirement of standing: parties that do not face an imminent threat
sufficient to support standing likewise do not face a hardship rendering their
claim ripe.44 Given that the constitutionally mandated imminence
requirement is the same for ripeness and standing, this Article will, for
convenience, discuss the imminence requirement solely in terms of
standing.45
Although there are several reasons for the imminence requirement,46 in
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the Supreme Court stated that imminence is
relevant to justiciability only insofar as it relates to the probability that an
injury will occur.47 Of course, lack of risk does not eliminate risk itself;
rather, it provides more opportunity for other factors to influence the risk.
Thus, as the Court has explained, the more remote an injury is in time, the
less likely it is to occur.48 For example, suppose Paul seeks an injunction
against Duncan based on Duncan’s threats to attack Paul in twenty years.
There is a good chance that at some point during those twenty years some
41
See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967), abrogated by Califano v. Sanders, 430
U.S. 99, 105 (1977).
42
See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1767 n.2 (2010) (“Ripeness
reflects constitutional considerations that implicate ‘Article III limitations on judicial power[]’ . . . .”
(quoting Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 57 n.18 (1993))).
43
See Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 149 (stating that ripeness turns, in part, on the “hardship to the
parties of withholding court consideration”).
44
See MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 128 n.8 (2007); Hotel & Rest. Emps.
Union, Local 25 v. Attorney Gen., 804 F.2d 1256, 1277 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Silberman, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (equating constitutional ripeness with imminence), vacated, Hotel & Rest.
Emps. Union, Local 25 v. Smith, 846 F.2d 1499 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (en banc); see also Nichol, supra note
40, at 172 (noting the link between ripeness and standing).
45
Ripeness also has prudential aspects. See Stolt-*ielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1767 n.2 (noting the
“prudential reasons” underlying ripeness (quoting Reno, 509 U.S. at 57 n.18) (internal quotation mark
omitted)). The prudential component of ripeness asks whether the case is fit for judicial review at the
time of suit. Whether a case is fit for review does not implicate the power of the courts to act; instead, it
focuses on whether the court has adequate information to make an informed decision. See ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 2.4.1, at 119 (5th ed. 2007) (“[T]he focus on the quality of the
record seems prudential.”). On this understanding, courts have discretion to consider a claim that may
not be fit for review, but they are constitutionally forbidden from considering claims when delaying
review would not present a hardship to the plaintiff.
46
One reason to require imminence is to promote efficient use of resources. For more on this and
other reasons, see infra Part IV.C.
47
504 U.S. 555, 565 n.2 (1992) (stating that the “purpose” of “imminence” is “to ensure that the
alleged injury is not too speculative for Article III purposes—that the injury is ‘certainly impending’”
(quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
48
See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 565 n.2.
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intervening event will occur (such as Paul’s or Duncan’s death, or their
falling out of touch) that will prevent the attack from occurring.49 Because
the probability of the attack actually occurring is so low, Lujan suggests
that Paul lacks standing.
Because under the Court’s theory the imminence requirement is simply
one component of the requirement that a threatened injury not be too
speculative, the mere fact that an injury is not imminent should not
necessarily render that injury nonjusticiable. If an injury is inevitable, it is
justiciable even if it may not occur until the distant future.50 Thus, if Paul
could somehow demonstrate with certainty that Duncan would attack him
in twenty years, Paul would have standing to pursue his claim.
II. EXTENDING STANDING TO ALL THREATENED INJURIES
The minimum-risk requirement is an unwarranted limit on federal
power under Article III. A dispute constitutes a justiciable case if a plaintiff
has a personal interest at stake.51 A threat of injury, even if the threat is
small, establishes a personal interest. By insisting that Article III does not
empower courts to hear claims based on low risks of injury, current
standing doctrine prevents individuals who may indeed be injured in the
future (although at the time of suit the chance of injury is small) from
obtaining relief that would prevent that injury. It also limits the legislature’s
ability to provide redress for potential risks by barring federal courts from
enforcing laws to prevent those risks when the risks are small. Moreover,
the limits on probabilistic standing have resulted in unpredictability in
standing law both because courts have not precisely defined what
constitutes an adequate risk and because courts have often lacked the
information necessary to determine whether the risk of injury in a particular
case meets that threshold.
A. All Probabilistic Injuries Present an Actual Case or Controversy
Article III does not distinguish between low risks of harm and high
risks of harm. It states simply that federal courts may hear “Cases” or
“Controversies.”52 Article III does not define those terms. The
49

See Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 495–97 (2009).
The Court has made this observation in the ripeness context. See Reg’l Rail Reorganization Act
Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 143 (1974) (finding a claim ripe even though the injury was not imminent because
the “injurious event [was] certain to occur”).
51
Courts have defined the interests to support standing broadly to include not only economic and
physical interests, but also aesthetic, spiritual, and recreational interests. See Ass’n of Data Processing
Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970). Still, not all personal interests will suffice. Courts have
refused standing based on racial stigmatization, see Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 759 (1984), and the
interest in governmental compliance with the law, see United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179
(1974).
52
See supra Part I.A.
50
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Constitutional Convention also provides little insight on the meaning of the
terms; the only statement about them is that they limit the judicial power “to
cases of a Judiciary Nature.”53
Although there has been disagreement on the precise contours of what
constitutes a case, there is general agreement that a dispute constitutes a
case when two parties have adverse legal interests and that a court can
resolve the dispute through “decid[ing] on the rights” of the parties.54 Thus,
not all disputes form a case. Abstract disagreements about the law, for
example, do not form a justiciable case because they do not involve adverse
interests.55 The judicial power is properly invoked when a plaintiff has at
stake a personal interest that is adverse to the defendant’s interest and a
court can vindicate that interest immediately through a judicial order based
on a legal determination of the rights of the parties.56
A plaintiff facing a threat of injury from a defendant’s illegal conduct
meets this threshold. That plaintiff has an interest in preventing that injury
from occurring, or at least an interest in reducing the risk of its occurrence.
Thus, for example, if a factory’s emissions create a 10% chance that Paul,
who lives next door to the factory, will develop lung cancer, Paul has a real
interest in stopping the factory’s emissions even if there is a 90% chance
that the emissions will not cause him to develop cancer. If the law forbids
such emissions, a court may vindicate Paul’s interest by ordering the
factory to cease from producing those emissions. That is the reason why
courts have held that they have jurisdiction to hear claims for prospective
relief.57
The same reasoning applies when the risk of injury is extremely low.
In such cases, the plaintiff still has a personal interest that the courts may
vindicate through an appropriate order. If Paul faces only a 0.0001%
chance, or even a 0.00001% chance, of developing cancer because of the
factory’s emissions, he still has a real interest in stopping the factory’s
emissions even though there is little chance that the emissions will harm
him. To be sure, when the risk of injury is small, the plaintiff’s stake in the
53

THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 13, at 430; Richard J. Pierce,
Jr., Is Standing Law or Politics?, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1741, 1763–64 (1999) (stating that the statement was
“[t]he only remotely relevant” one regarding the case-or-controversy requirement).
54
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576 (1992) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
(1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803)); accord Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 598
(2007) (plurality opinion); id. at 636 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
55
See Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 297 (1979).
56
See MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007) (noting that to be justiciable,
the dispute must “admi[t] of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished
from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts” (alteration in
original) (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 241 (1937)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
57
See NRDC v. EPA, 464 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (finding risk of 1 in 200,000 sufficiently
substantial to support standing).
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case is correspondingly smaller. But the plaintiff still has a real-world
interest that the court may vindicate.
One might argue that a tiny risk of injury does not actually present a
dispute because there is an extremely low likelihood that the injury will
occur. But the fact that the injury might not occur does not render the claim
nonjusticiable; otherwise, federal courts would lack jurisdiction to hear any
claims for prospective relief because all potential future injuries have some
chance of not transpiring. Rather, it is the possibility that the injury might
occur that creates the plaintiff’s interest in the case and that ought to render
the case justiciable. Even when the risk of harm is very low, there is still
some chance that the threatened injury will occur. The plaintiff accordingly
has an interest at stake: he may be harmed.
What this means is that all claims based on a risk of injury present an
actual case or controversy, no matter how small the risk. So long as (1) the
challenged activity increases the plaintiff’s risk of suffering harm and (2) a
judicial order could stop the challenged activity, thereby removing the
increased risk of harm, courts should have Article III jurisdiction to hear the
claim.58 Whether there is an actual dispute between two parties is a binary
question: there either is a dispute, or there is not. If a substantial risk of
injury constitutes an actual dispute, a small risk of injury does as well. The
degree of risk goes to the intensity of the dispute, not whether it exists at
all.59
The Supreme Court has recognized a similar argument in concluding
that there is no threshold requirement for the size of an injury. It has
explained that any “identifiable trifle” relating to a cognizable interest will
support standing.60 Thus, standing treats identically a plaintiff who alleges
58

Recall that, aside from injury, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the injury is traceable to the
defendant and that a judicial order would redress the injury. See Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms,
130 S. Ct. 2743, 2752 (2010) (setting forth requirements of “traceab[ility]” and “redressab[ility]” as
prerequisites to standing); supra note 18 and accompanying text.
59
One might argue that if the defendant’s action produces only a small threat of injury and the
plaintiff would still face some threat of incurring that same injury even if the defendant’s conduct were
stopped, then the injury the plaintiff may face is not traceable to the defendant and would not be
redressed by a court order in the plaintiff’s favor. But in Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court explained that
even when a plaintiff faces a risk of injury from multiple sources, if the action represents even a “small
incremental step” towards eliminating that risk, then it satisfies the traceability and redressability
requirements of Article III. 549 U.S. 497, 524 (2007).
60
United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669,
689 n.14 (1973) (quoting Kenneth Culp Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 601,
613 (1968)). There are reasons to question this doctrine. If any identifiable trifle can support standing,
standing should pose no barrier to any plaintiff’s suit because anyone who is motivated enough to file
suit has suffered some emotional distress—which is at least a trifling injury—from the challenged
conduct. Indeed, for this reason, the Court itself has limited the types of injuries that may support
standing. See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc.,
454 U.S. 464, 486 (1982) (refusing to recognize standing based solely on psychic harm). This limitation
has led to confusion in standing law because the Court has refused to abandon its rhetorical stance that
any trifle suffices for standing and has continued to allow standing based on certain types of psychic
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only 1¢ in harm and a plaintiff who alleges a $100,000 injury; both have a
personal stake warranting invocation of the courts.61 A plaintiff’s interest in
a case depends on both the size and likelihood of suffering an injury.62
Therefore, because standing does not impose a minimum requirement for
the size of the injury, it also should not impose a threshold for the
likelihood of injury.
Indeed, more than being merely conceptually inconsistent with the
“identifiable trifle” standard, the minimum-risk requirement directly
conflicts with holdings that the size of the harm is irrelevant to whether a
plaintiff has standing. That is because risk of harm itself—as opposed to the
particular harm that is threatened—may constitute an injury in fact. To use
the same example as before, the injury supporting Paul’s standing is not the
cancer that he may develop, but the risk that he might develop cancer.
Although many cases focus only on the harms that will result when
determining whether a plaintiff has standing to challenge future injuries, a
number of decisions establish that a risk of harm itself constitutes an injury
in fact.63 One example comes from the equal protection context. Courts
have held that the relevant injury a person suffers from unlawful
discrimination is the loss of opportunity that results from discrimination,
regardless of the other consequences of that discrimination. Thus, where a
state discriminates against a job applicant on the basis of race, the denial of
opportunity to compete on equal footing for the job is the relevant injury,
not the denial of the job.64 Indeed, even if the minority applicant is hired, he

injury such as the displeasure arising from harm to aesthetic interests. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.
Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 183 (2000). That said, there are also reasons for
retaining the identifiable trifle standard. Among other things, the standard prevents judges from
imposing their preferences in deciding which cases are “worth” adjudicating. Different people value
different things differently. A dollar might matter more to X than to Y, because Y might be much richer
than X. Setting a minimum threshold on the value of the injury for standing risks excluding harms that
some might think are important. See generally Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Standing for Privilege: The Failure
of Injury Analysis, 82 B.U. L. REV. 301, 324–28 (2002) (noting that judges recognize injury based on
their own preferences).
61
See Leiter, supra note 7, at 406.
62
This concept is reflected in the notion of expected value. See 5 DAVID BESANKO, DAVID
DRANOVE, MARK SHANLEY & SCOTT SCHAEFER, ECONOMICS OF STRATEGY 470 & 503 n.2 (5th ed.
2010).
63
See Sunstein, supra note 7, at 46–50. One example of risk causing injury outside the legal context
comes from the stock market. The market routinely discounts the present values of a firm’s securities
based on the risks associated with that firm’s future performance. Conduct today that increases the risk
for the firm tomorrow injures the firm by reducing the firm’s present value. See Daniel A. Farber,
Uncertainty as a Basis for Standing, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1123, 1123 (2005).
64
See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 211 (1995) (stating that injury occurs
when a “discriminatory classification prevent[s] the plaintiff from competing on an equal footing”
(alteration in original) (quoting Ne. Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of
Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 667 (1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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may still have suffered the harm of discrimination.65 Loss of opportunity to
compete on a level playing field is essentially a risk injury: the
discrimination increases the probability that the discriminated-against
individual will not get the job.66
Together with the principle that the size of the harm is irrelevant to
whether a plaintiff has standing, the fact that a risk of harm may constitute
an injury itself means that any risk of harm, even a tiny one, should suffice
for Article III standing. Indeed, the Supreme Court has implicitly
recognized this point in cases alleging procedural injury.67
Procedural injuries occur when agencies undertake actions without
affording the statutory procedures due to the plaintiff—for example, when
an agency promulgates a rule without addressing substantive comments
submitted by the plaintiff on that rule.68 In those cases, courts have insisted
that the injury supporting standing is not the failure of the agency to
observe the procedures; rather, the injury stems from the interest that is
affected by the agency’s failure to observe the procedures.69 But it is clear
that the injury is not the effect of the agency action on the plaintiff. Courts
have explained that standing is appropriate only if the court can redress the
injury in fact to the plaintiff,70 and prevailing on a procedural claim does not
necessarily prevent the agency from undertaking the same action.71 Even if
a plaintiff prevails on a claim that an agency failed to address the plaintiff’s
comments, the agency may still promulgate the same regulation on remand,
just with a better justification. But the successful claim does reduce the
probability that the agency will promulgate the same rule; the comments
may lead the agency to promulgate a different rule.72 Thus, the relevant
injury that is redressed in a procedural claim is the increased probability of
harm.73
65
Likewise, even if the nonminority applicant would have received the job under a race-neutral
process, the minority applicant is still harmed if the actual reason for the decision was race-based.
66
One might argue that the recognition of standing for loss-of-opportunity claims might be based
on a normative conclusion that such injuries are particularly important and therefore do not establish that
standing extends to other risk injuries. But the Court has not made that distinction. Moreover, the
normative desirability of recognizing standing for a particular claim is encompassed by the separate
judicially cognizable test. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992).
67
Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 495–97 (2009); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573.
68
See Summers, 555 U.S. at 496–97.
69
See id.
70
See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180–81 (2000).
71
See Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III,
91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 228 (1992).
72
See STEPHEN G. BREYER, RICHARD B. STEWART, CASS R. SUNSTEIN & ADRIAN VERMEULE,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY: PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES 351 (6th ed. 2006)
(describing the range of consequences from judicial remands of agency actions).
73
To be sure, some injuries—such as stigma and dissatisfaction with government action—cannot
support standing. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 45, § 2.3.2, at 74. But those exceptions depend on the
type of injury, not the size of that injury. Economic injury will always support standing even if the
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Although courts have deemed them justiciable, procedural injuries
present a conundrum under the minimum-risk requirement. The reason is
that many claims asserting procedural injury do not allege imminent harm
because plaintiffs often must challenge administrative actions long before
any harm occurs. Instead of declaring these claims nonjusticiable, however,
the Supreme Court has stated that the imminence requirement does not
apply to claims based solely on procedural injury.74 Thus, in Lujan, the
Court explained that a person “living adjacent to the site for proposed
construction of a federally licensed dam has standing to challenge the
licensing agency’s failure to prepare an environmental impact statement,
even though . . . the dam will not be completed for many years.”75
But as noted earlier, under the Court’s view, the imminence
requirement is simply one component of the minimum-risk requirement.76
Imminence ensures that the harm is not overly speculative.77 There is no
reason to treat a low probability of injury resulting from a lack of
imminence differently from a low probability resulting from other causes.78
The reason that an injury is unlikely to occur is irrelevant to whether a
dispute constitutes a case; all that matters is whether the parties have
interests that are adverse and the court can issue a ruling that resolves that
conflict.79 Accordingly, if Article III does not forbid actions based on
procedural claims where the injury is unlikely to occur because it is not
imminent, neither should it prohibit claims based on injuries that are
unlikely to occur for other reasons.
B. Other Advantages of the “Any-Risk-of-Harm” Standard
Recognizing that any threat of injury constitutes a justiciable case or
controversy would result in a number of other improvements over the
minimum-risk requirement. To start, broad probabilistic standing would
allow the courts to carry out better their role of preventing avoidable harms.
One reason that courts have the power to award injunctions and other forms
of prospective relief is that people should not be forced to sustain injuries

economic loss is extremely small. Likewise, if an injury is of the sort that cannot support standing,
standing will still be unavailable even if that injury is extremely large. See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian
Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 485–86 (1982) (refusing to
find standing based on intense dissatisfaction with government policies because dissatisfaction with
government policies cannot alone support standing).
74
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992).
75
Id.
76
See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
77
See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
78
If anything, a lack of imminence provides greater reasons for not recognizing standing because
other branches might have sufficient time to cure the alleged harm. See infra Part IV.C.
79
See supra text accompanying note 56.
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that can be prevented.80 The minimum-risk requirement impairs that power.
Although a low-threat injury only rarely occurs, it still may transpire. For
example, even if the risk of injury is one in a million, there is a greater than
50% chance that at least one resident in a town of one million residents
subject to that risk will sustain that injury.81 Under the minimum-risk
requirement, those individuals who will eventually end up suffering that
unlikely injury are prevented from obtaining judicial intervention to prevent
that injury.
Extending the judicial power to any threat of injury would also better
achieve legislative goals. Congress ordinarily does not legislate to prevent
injuries to particular individuals. Instead, legislation usually is targeted at
reducing the number of injuries to the population at large.82 It is, in other
words, probabilistic in nature.83 Imposing a threshold risk requirement for
standing undermines Congress’s ability to legislate in this way. Congress
may seek to prevent all risks of a particular type of harm, but courts will not
enforce that legislation with respect to an individual who faces only a small
risk of suffering that harm. Indeed, in some cases no individual may face
the risk necessary to support standing, and consequently Congress’s
policies could go unenforced. In short, under the minimum-risk
requirement, Congress and the courts talk past each other.84
Extending standing to any risk of harm would also result in a more
rational doctrine. A rational plaintiff’s interest in a case depends not on the
size of the harm he faces but on the expected value of the harm—that is, the
probability of the harm multiplied by the size of the harm. For example, a
plaintiff should treat a 10% chance of a $500 injury the same as a 50%
chance of a $100 injury, because both have an expected value of $50. But
80

See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES—EQUITY—RESTITUTION § 2.5(3), at
92–93 (2d ed. 1993) (articulating arguments underlying coercive remedies).
81
Indeed, there is a greater than 50% chance of injury occurring to a resident in a town of 693,147
residents. This results from solving for x in the following inequality: 1 - (999,999/1,000,000)x > 0.5.
82
See Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445–46 (1915)
(distinguishing between legislation, which is general, and adjudication, which is particularized); Leiter,
supra note 7, at 413–14.
83
See Felix Frankfurter, A *ote on Advisory Opinions, 37 HARV. L. REV. 1002, 1005 (1924)
(“[L]egislation to a considerable extent must necessarily be based on probabilities . . . .”).
84
Courts could solve this problem by considering standing based on the aggregate risk to a
population. Under that approach, standing would be easier to establish because, even though one person
might not face a sufficient threat of injury, the community as a whole would face a substantial threat of
injury. But in Summers v. Earth Island Institute, the Court rejected this approach. 555 U.S. 488, 497–99
(2009). There, an environmental association brought suit to challenge regulations that would affect
various parcels of land regulated by the U.S. Forest Service. Id. at 491. Although no member had firm
plans to visit a site covered by this regulation, the organization had more than 700,000 members who
enjoy the forest in which the sites were located, making it statistically likely that at least one of the
members of the organization would visit one of those sites. Id. at 497–98. The Court held that the
association lacked standing, explaining that standing cannot be aggregated among the members of an
organization; instead, each member must be evaluated independently for standing. Id. at 498–99.
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because of the minimum-risk requirement, standing doctrine does not treat
these two equivalent expected values the same way.85
As noted earlier, although it imposes a minimum requirement for risk
of injury, standing does not impose a minimum threshold for the size of an
injury; any identifiable trifle will suffice.86 Consequently, a plaintiff may
have standing to challenge a small injury that is likely to occur, but lack
standing to challenge a large injury that is unlikely to occur, even though
the expected harm from those two injuries is the same. Indeed, under
current doctrine, standing exists for a potential trivial injury that barely
clears the probability threshold, but does not exist for a severe injury that is
just below that probability threshold. This is true even if the expected harm
of the more serious injury exceeds that of the expected harm of the more
likely but trivial injury. This discrepancy is reflected in decisions finding
standing for an individual likely to suffer the tiny harm of the denial of a
fraction of a vote,87 but denying standing for an individual who faced a
smaller risk of the greater harm of being subject to a chokehold that had the
potential to inflict serious physical injury.88 Although the two injuries are
not easily compared, it is hardly unreasonable to think that the expected
harm of the less likely chokehold exceeded that of the less potentially
harmful but more likely denial of a fraction of a vote.
A similar irrationality occurs in cases where a large number of people
face a risk of harm. Imagine two situations, each involving a population of
1000 people. In the first scenario, one member of that population has a
100% chance of being harmed. In the second scenario, there is a 100%
chance that one random person in the population of 1000 will be harmed;
thus, each person faces a 0.1% chance of harm. In both cases, a person will
be hurt. But under the minimum-risk requirement, standing is proper only in
the first case. (One might argue that a 0.1% chance of harm is substantial
enough to justify standing, but that objection is easily answered by
increasing the population at risk so as to reduce the risk of harm to any one
person.) The difference is that in the first situation we know ex ante who
will be hurt while in the second we know only ex post. But that difference
should not matter, at least so far as justiciability is concerned. In both cases
a court may enter an order preventing the harm (in the former case by
granting an injunction for the particular victim, in the latter for anyone
among the potential victims). Of course, there is a question about who is the
appropriate plaintiff. In the case of the known victim, the plaintiff is
85

See Leiter, supra note 7, at 408–09 (making a similar observation).
See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
87
See United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S.
669, 689 n.14 (1973) (“We have allowed important interests to be vindicated by plaintiffs with no more
at stake in the outcome of an action than a fraction of a vote, a $5 fine and costs, and a $1.50 poll tax.”
(citations omitted)).
88
See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102–03 (1983).
86
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obvious, while in the case of the random victim, any individual who faces
the threat of harm has a stake in the suit. The consequence is that many
individuals have standing to bring suit. But the number of potential
plaintiffs does not affect whether a dispute presents a justiciable
controversy. Courts routinely hear claims, like those alleging securities
fraud, involving many plaintiffs.89
Aside from the irrationality of the doctrine, the minimum-risk
requirement is troublingly imprecise. As currently framed, the requirement
involves a qualitative, not a quantitative, assessment. To establish standing,
plaintiffs need not clear a precise numerical threshold of risk for standing;
instead, they must show that the risk of injury is “real.”90 But courts have
disagreed about when a risk of harm is sufficiently high to be real.91
Moreover, even when there is agreement about the appropriate qualitative
standard, reasonable people routinely differ about whether that qualitative
standard is satisfied. What constitutes a “real” threat of injury for one
person may not for another.92 Ambiguity is the inevitable consequence of a
qualitative standard.
Exacerbating this problem is the fact that courts generally have proven
themselves incapable of applying the minimum-risk requirement in a
rigorous way. As a general matter, courts have failed to engage in a careful
analysis in evaluating whether a threatened injury alleged by a plaintiff has
a sufficient likelihood of occurring. One example of this shortcoming is in
the courts’ failure to recognize that most claims of future injury actually
involve multiple probabilities.
Consider the simple case in which Jim seeks an order barring Todd
from hitting him with a bat. This claim involves at least two separate
probabilistic events. There is first the probability of Todd actually
undertaking the activity that could cause harm—swinging the bat. The

89

See FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998); accord id. at 36 (Scalia, J., dissenting). To be sure,
courts have refused to recognize standing for individuals claiming a generalized grievance. But so long
as each plaintiff has an individualized interest at stake—as is the case when each individual faces a
threat of harm—each plaintiff has standing to bring suit even if the result is that many different plaintiffs
have standing. See id. at 35. An example may illustrate this point. Suppose several people each face a
20% chance of developing cancer from exposure to a toxic substance. Although each individual faces an
identical risk of developing cancer, the risk is personal to each individual. Each person faces an
individual risk of harm.
90
See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
91
Compare Sierra Club v. EPA, 292 F.3d 895, 899 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (requiring a substantial risk for
standing), with Vill. of Elk Grove Vill. v. Evans, 997 F.2d 328, 329 (7th Cir. 1993) (allowing any risk to
support standing).
92
Compare, e.g., La. Envtl. Action Network v. EPA, 172 F.3d 65, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (concluding
that the probability of harm from a potential deposit of hazardous waste was sufficiently substantial to
support standing), with id. at 71–72 (Sentelle, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (disagreeing
with the majority opinion).
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second is the probability that the swing will hit Jim, causing him harm.93
When the occurrence of an event depends on multiple probabilities, the
probability of that event occurring is the product of each of the
probabilities. Thus, if there is a 40% chance that Todd will swing the bat,
and a 10% chance that Todd will hit Jim if he swings the bat, there is only a
4% (40% × 10%) chance that Jim will suffer harm (assuming the
probabilities are independent).
Courts addressing probabilistic standing have generally not analyzed
separate probabilities in assessing whether the plaintiff had standing. In
United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures
(SCRAP), for example, environmentalists located in Washington D.C.
challenged a freight rate increase for railroads.94 The plaintiffs claimed that
the rate increase would lead to less recycling because the greater rates
would allow railroads to afford transporting raw material, which
consequently would encourage more mining and lumbering.95 According to
the environmentalists, these events could cause them aesthetic harm
because some of these resources might be taken from the Washington area,
resulting in more refuse in local parks.96 The probability of each of these
events occurring was rather low. There was uncertainty whether the rate
increases would indeed result in more consumption of raw materials,
whether the consumption would result in mining and logging in the
Washington area, whether those activities would produce refuse in local
parks, and whether the plaintiffs would visit any of the precise locations
affected by greater refuse. Although it is difficult to measure the probability
of each of these events, the probability of each event occurring
independently was no doubt low, and consequently the product of those
probabilities was extremely low.97 Nevertheless, the Court found standing.98
Contrast SCRAP with Lujan.99 There, petitioners sought to challenge a
government regulation exposing endangered species in foreign countries to

93
There is also the question whether the harm the plaintiff suffers is cognizable under the law—a
probabilistic inquiry because courts have introduced uncertainty by refusing to recognize some injuries
as sufficient for standing. Cf. Yuval Feldman & Doron Teichman, Are All Legal Probabilities Created
Equal?, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 980, 985–86 (2009) (discussing the probabilistic nature of uncertain law).
94
412 U.S. 669, 678 (1973).
95
Id. at 675–76.
96
Id. at 688.
97
See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 548 n.2 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (criticizing
the “attenuated nature of the injury” in SCRAP). The Court subsequently recognized in Whitmore v.
Arkansas that the string of probabilities in SCRAP rendered the alleged injury “attenuated.” 495 U.S.
149, 158 (1990). But in doing so, the Whitmore Court did not conclude that the probabilities were not so
remote as to make the claim in SCRAP plausible. Instead, the Court switched gears, justifying SCRAP
on the ground that “the string of occurrences alleged [c]ould happen immediately.” Id. at 159. That the
injury could happen immediately, however, does not establish that the injury is likely to happen.
98
SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 690.
99
504 U.S. 555 (1992).
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harm.100 The petitioners based their standing on the claim that they intended
to go to the foreign countries to see the endangered animals and that the
regulation would impair their ability to do so.101 The Court denied standing
on the ground that the petitioners did not specify when they intended to go
to those countries.102 The fact that the petitioners did not specify a particular
date does tend to reduce the probability that they would indeed go to those
foreign countries, but their averment that they had every intention of going
still seems to create a realistic probability that they would eventually go. Of
course, even if the petitioners went to those countries, there was uncertainty
whether they would be unable to see the animals because of the regulation.
But it is difficult to say that the probability of harm was clearly lower than
the probability of harm in SCRAP.
One likely explanation for courts’ failure to assess probabilistic injuries
rigorously is that courts often must make their assessment without adequate
information about the probabilities of harm. Probabilities are predictions
about future events, and those predictions themselves are often imprecise.103
Doctors may agree, for example, that secondhand exposure to cigarette
smoke increases the risk of developing cancer, but they do not agree on the
precise amount of risk increase. Similar unknowns plague many other areas
of risk assessment. Consider global warming, the threat of nuclear
meltdown, the chances of entering into an economic recession, and the
likelihood that a house will be devoured by termites—all risks that
undeniably exist, but whose size is a matter of dispute.
Uncertainty about probability forces courts to forego precise
calculations of probabilities and instead to evaluate probability on a gestalt
feeling of the likelihood of a harm occurring. Assessments of this sort,
however, are vulnerable to biases. One such bias is the availability
heuristic, which leads people to have a heightened fear of a risk of harm if
an example of that harm occurring readily comes to mind.104 This heuristic
suggests that decisions about whether a threat of injury is adequate may
depend more on an individual judge’s personal experiences and biases than
100

Id. at 558–59.
Id. at 563–64.
102
Id. at 564.
103
See generally Hillel J. Einhorn & Robin M. Hogarth, Ambiguity and Uncertainty in Probabilistic
Inference, 92 PSYCHOL. REV. 433 (1985) (describing uncertainty about uncertainty).
104
See Norbert Schwarz & Leigh Ann Vaughn, The Availability Heuristic Revisited: Ease of Recall
and Content of Recall as Distinct Sources of Information, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 103, 103 (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin & Daniel Kahneman
eds., 2002); see also Cass R. Sunstein, On the Divergent American Reactions to Terrorism and Climate
Change, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 534 (2007) (discussing the practical impact of the heuristic). Other
considerations influence perceptions of risks. For example, one study concludes that the expressive
function of law may lead people to have heightened perceptions of the risk of avoiding conviction
arising from a lack of clarity in the law, as compared to the risk of avoiding conviction from uncertain
enforcement. See Feldman & Teichman, supra note 93.
101
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actual probabilities.105 This may explain in part the Court’s willingness to
find standing in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental
Services (TOC), Inc.,106 but its refusal to do so in City of Los Angeles v.
Lyons.107 In Laidlaw, the plaintiffs brought suit against a company because
of the alleged risk of harm from the discharge of pollutants into a river
waterway, even though the plaintiffs conceded that continual past emissions
had not caused them harm.108 In Lyons, the plaintiff had previously been
choked by police and alleged that he might again be subject to a police
chokehold.109 No doubt, the Justices, who were law-abiding property
owners, could more easily relate to property damage from emissions than to
experiencing a chokehold while being arrested.
These cognitive biases are likely not the only extraneous factors that
influence probability determinations. Given the entirely inadequate
information courts must use to evaluate risk, it seems likely that a variety of
considerations other than the size of the threat of injury creep into courts’
standing determinations for claims of unlikely future injuries. Although
framing their decisions in terms of whether a threat is speculative or not,
courts may actually base their standing decisions on matters such as
separation of powers, federalism, efficiency, docket size, or some other
concern. This, too, may provide some explanation of the decisions in Lyons
and Laidlaw. In Lyons, the plaintiff sought an injunction against the Los
Angeles police,110 but the suit in Laidlaw was against a private company.111
The denial of standing in Lyons and the grant of standing in Laidlaw may
reflect the Court’s unwillingness to interfere in the workings of state
government.112 This is not to say that the Justices consciously based their
decisions on these considerations. But the point remains that the current
doctrine is sufficiently vague that courts may easily justify deciding many
cases either way, and those decisions may be influenced by a number of
factors other than the size of the risk of injury.

105
Cf. Nichol, supra note 60, at 332 (arguing that Justices reach conclusions about adequacy of
injury based on personal experience and intuition).
106
528 U.S. 167 (2000).
107
461 U.S. 95 (1983).
108
528 U.S. at 181–84, 199.
109
461 U.S. at 97–98.
110
Id. at 99–100.
111
528 U.S. at 173.
112
See Fallon, supra note 7, at 648 (arguing that justiciability rulings may depend on concerns
about interfering with the government). The Laidlaw majority distinguished Lyons on the ground that in
Lyons it was speculative whether the harm would ever “take place,” while in Laidlaw it was clear that
the illegal activity―the discharge of pollutants―would continue. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 184. But the
continuance or not of the illegal activity is not the relevant question. Rather, the question is whether
there is any injury from that activity, and in Laidlaw, there had not been injury from the ongoing
activity.
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Extending Article III jurisdiction to all threats of injury would largely
solve these problems. Judges would no longer face the prospect of guessing
based on insufficient information whether a particular risk is adequately
substantial, and litigants would no longer face the prospect of decisions
being rendered based on biases and considerations other than the threshold
of the injury.113
III. ADDRESSING OTHER REASONS FOR EXCLUDING SMALL RISKS OF
INJURY UNDER ARTICLE III
Although a low probability of injury presents a dispute capable of
judicial resolution, there may be other reasons to interpret Article III in a
way that does not extend to those claims. For example, one might argue that
the historical backdrop against which Article III was written establishes that
the Framers did not intend federal courts to be empowered to hear disputes
based on small risks of harm. Or one might think that ruling on lowprobability injuries runs afoul of the restriction on advisory opinions or
violates separation of powers in other ways. Another possible objection is
that extending standing to all potential injuries would overwhelm the
federal courts with litigation. This Part considers those arguments.
A. Historical Equity
The Supreme Court has explained that the case-or-controversy
requirement limits the judicial power to deciding those disputes
“traditionally amenable to, and resolved by, the judicial process.”114
Historically, courts did not have the power to award relief for all threatened
injuries. Instead, according to Mitford’s 1782 treatise on equity, courts
would enter an injunction only when the plaintiff faced a “probable ground
of possible injury.”115 Justice Johnson articulated the same standard in 1792,
stating that a plaintiff must confront a “probable danger” of injury,116 as did
Justice Story in his Commentaries on Equity Pleadings, in which he states
that an injunction is appropriate to prevent “a probable ground of possible

113
This is not to say that courts must exercise jurisdiction for all claims of any potential risk. As
discussed infra Part IV, one might create a system under which, even though they possess Article III
jurisdiction, courts may decline to exercise that jurisdiction based on the cost of the remedy, the effect of
exercising jurisdiction on the government, or a host of other costs.
114
Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 774 (2000) (quoting
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 102 (1998) (internal quotation mark omitted)).
115
JOHN MITFORD & SAMUEL TYLER, MITFORD’S AND TYLER’S PLEADINGS AND PRACTICE IN
EQUITY: A TREATISE ON THE PLEADINGS IN SUITS IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY BY ENGLISH BILL 106
(5th ed. 1890); accord JOHN MITFORD, A TREATISE ON THE PLEADINGS IN SUITS IN THE COURT OF
CHANCERY BY ENGLISH BILL 8 (2d ed. 1787).
116
Georgia v. Braislford, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 402, 405 (1792) (Johnson, J.).
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injury.”117 Other historical sources espoused a similar view.118 Thus, it was
not necessary for the plaintiff to prove that the injury necessarily would
occur. But when an injury was unlikely to occur, relief would be denied.119
It may be that these historical limitations on equity are the original
source of standing law’s minimum-risk requirement.120 But even so, the
Supreme Court has separated Article III from equity in more recent times.
Since the 1930s, the Court has held that Article III does not confine the
judiciary to the traditional forms of equity. Thus, in Aetna Life Insurance
Co. v. Haworth,121 the Court rejected the argument that Article III did not
permit the issuance of a declaratory judgment, explaining that Article III
“did not crystallize into changeless form the procedure of 1789 as the only
possible means for presenting a case or controversy.”122
Moreover, recent cases suggest that standing imposes a lower threshold
than that historically required for an injunction. One example is
Massachusetts v. EPA.123 There, Massachusetts challenged the EPA’s
refusal to issue a rule regulating emissions that allegedly contribute to
global warming.124 Massachusetts claimed standing on the ground that
global warming could threaten the loss of land from rising sea levels by the
117

1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY PLEADINGS, AND THE INCIDENTS THEREOF,
ACCORDING TO THE PRACTICE OF THE COURTS OF EQUITY OF ENGLAND AND AMERICA, ch. 2, § 9, at 9
(10th ed. 1892).
118
See, e.g., City of Rochester v. Curtiss, Cl. Ch. 336, 339 (N.Y. Ch. 1840) (“In cases of doubtful
right or remote and contingent injury, this court will wait for the right to be settled at law or the injury to
become imminent, before it will interfere with its extraordinary process of injunction.”); Coalter v.
Hunter, 25 Va. (4 Rand.) 58, 66 (1826) (“If [plaintiff] had been in the actual enjoyment of the use of the
water, and had reasonable ground to apprehend that [defendant] intended to deprive him of that
enjoyment, an application to the Chancellor to prevent this threatened injury, might have been proper.”);
Bush v. Western, (1720) 24 Eng. Rep. 237 (K.B.) 237–38 (refusing to grant relief to a mortgage holder,
as opposed to a land possessor, for potential damage to property since the holder did not face a sufficient
probability of injury); 1 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, JR., A TREATISE ON EQUITABLE REMEDIES;
SUPPLEMENTARY TO POMEROY’S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 523, at 888 (1905) (stating that “a mere
possibility of a future nuisance will not support an injunction,” but nor is it necessary to prove “that the
nuisance will occur”; rather, “it is sufficient . . . that the risk of its happening is greater than a reasonable
man would incur” (first emphasis added)).
119
See Clinton Liberal Inst. v. Fletcher, 55 How. Pr. 431, 432 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1878); 3 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *225 (“[H]e, who hath the remainder for life only, is not entitled to sue
for waste; since his interest may never perhaps come into possession, and then he hath suffered no
injury.”).
120
The Court has also justified the hearing of future injuries under Article III on the ground that
historically courts could hear such claims. See Vicksburg Waterworks Co. v. Vicksburg, 185 U.S. 65, 82
(1902) (holding that a threatened injury presented a case because “one of the most valuable features of
equity jurisdiction[] [is] to anticipate and prevent a threatened injury, where the damages would be
insufficient or irreparable”).
121
300 U.S. 227 (1937).
122
Id. at 240 (quoting Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249, 264
(1933)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
123
549 U.S. 497 (2007).
124
Id. at 514.
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end of the twenty-first century.125 But traditionally, injunctions were not
available to prevent harms on such a time horizon. In the nineteenth-century
case Fletcher v. Bealey, a paper mill, which operated on a river and
depended on pure water for its operation, sought an injunction against a
plant that was discharging substantial quantities of sulfuric “vat waste”
upstream.126 The court denied injunctive relief.127 Although acknowledging
that within ten years the water “would be polluted sufficiently to do a great
amount of injury to the Plaintiff,” the court explained that by that time
advances in technology might prevent the damage.128 If the limitations of
equity defined the scope of Article III, Fletcher would suggest that
Massachusetts lacked standing in Massachusetts v. EPA. But the
Massachusetts v. EPA Court found standing based on the threatened loss of
coastal land, even though advances in technology might have prevented the
damage.
Most important, the reasons underlying the constitutional doctrine of
standing are not the same as those underlying the limitations on injunctive
relief. Under current understanding, the main reason for standing is to
preserve separation of powers.129 More functional concerns motivate the
restrictions on injunctive relief. The ancient Court of Chancery did not have
the same degree of concern about separation of powers because the court
was acting on behalf of the Crown.130 The reason for the probable harm
requirement was to preserve judicial resources by refusing to issue
injunctions except when necessary and to avoid placing unnecessary
burdens on parties.131
The doctrine of ripeness most clearly illustrates the distinction between
the probability requirements of equity and Article III. Ripeness has both

125

Id. at 541–542 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (noting that one harm supporting standing was the
possible loss of land in the next few decades).
126
(1885) 28 Ch. 688 at 693–95 (Eng.).
127
Id. at 700.
128
Id. at 699–700; see also Attorney Gen. v. Kingston-on-Thames, (1865) 34 H.L. 481 at 487
(Eng.) (refusing to enjoin the town of Kingston from dumping sewage into the Thames on the ground
that that any harm from dumping might not arise for “a hundred years hence”).
129
See Hessick, supra note 17, at 296.
130
DAVID LINDSAY KEIR, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF MODERN BRITAIN SINCE 1485, at 29
(9th ed. 1969) (“[C]ontact between the Crown and its judges was close and . . . the judges reckoned
themselves very fully its servants.”); see also id. at 142. That said, beginning in the seventeenth century,
England did recognize some authority of the courts to check the Crown. See Roscoe Pound, The End of
Law as Developed in Juristic Thought, 27 HARV. L. REV. 605, 622 (1914) (noting “the victory of the
courts in the contests between courts and crown in seventeenth-century England”).
131
See Gene R. Shreve, Federal Injunctions and the Public Interest, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 382,
419 (1983) (“For a court to issue an injunction without finding the probability of imminent harm is
wasteful of scarce judicial resources.”); Developments in the Law—Injunctions, 78 HARV. L. REV. 994,
1005–08 (1965) (explaining that the imminence requirement derives from a desire to avoid overly
regulating conduct).
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constitutional and prudential components.132 As noted earlier, the
constitutional component mirrors the imminence requirement of standing; a
party must face a sufficiently immediate threat of injury that presents an
actual controversy.133 The prudential component extends beyond this
constitutional core. It aims to improve the decisionmaking process and to
avoid the unnecessary expenditure of judicial resources.134 These are
precisely the functional concerns underlying the hesitancy of federal courts
to grant injunctions based on remote harms.135
Courts have also treated requirements for an injunction more flexibly
than those for standing. In determining whether to grant an injunction,
courts consider the severity of an alleged harm together with the likelihood
that the harm will occur.136 The greater the threatened harm, the less the
required showing of the harm’s likelihood of occurring.137 By contrast, in
determining whether a risk of injury is sufficient, courts have generally not
inquired into the severity of the threatened harm alleged.138 Instead, they
have considered the likelihood of the injury occurring independent from the
nature of the harm. Whatever the threatened injury—be it a chokehold that
can result in permanent physical damage,139 the impairment of the ability to
view and enjoy animals,140 the destruction of coastline,141 the deprivation of
hospital services,142 or the death penalty143—courts have employed the same
probability requirements, asking only whether the risks of injury are
realistic and imminent, without factoring in the gravity of the harm.
B. Advisory Opinions
Another possible objection to the any-risk-of-harm standard is that
allowing standing based on any threat of injury potentially runs afoul of the
restriction on advisory opinions. Courts and commentators have disagreed
132

See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1767 n.2 (2010) (quoting
Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 57 n.18 (1993)).
133
See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
134
See Nichol, supra note 40, at 176 (detailing the prudential uses of ripeness).
135
See Hotel & Rest. Emps. Union, Local 25 v. Attorney Gen., 804 F.2d 1256, 1277 n.10 (D.C. Cir.
1986) (Silberman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that the prudential aspects of
ripeness derive from equity), vacated, 846 F.2d 1499 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (en banc).
136
See, e.g., Oakland Tribune, Inc. v. Chronicle Publ’g Co., 762 F.2d 1374, 1376 (9th Cir. 1985)
(describing a “sliding scale” of likelihood and severity of harm).
137
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 933(1) cmt. b (1977) (“The more serious the impending
harm, the less justification there is for taking the chances that are involved in pronouncing the harm too
remote.”).
138
See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
139
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 97–99 (1983).
140
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–63 (1992).
141
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 521 (2007).
142
Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 43 (1976).
143
Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 156–57 (1990).
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on the precise definition of an advisory opinion.144 An expansive definition
is that an advisory opinion encompasses a judicial decision that has no
effect in the real world.145 Under this definition, a decision on a claim based
on an extremely-low-probability injury would arguably be an advisory
opinion because resolving the claim would require the court to provide
relief from an injury that is almost certain not to occur and thus likely to
have no real-world effect.
This is the view that the Supreme Court espoused in United Public
Workers of America (C.I.O.) v. Mitchell.146 There, several federal employees
who sought to participate in political campaigns brought suit challenging
the potential enforcement of the Hatch Act, which prohibits federal
employees from participating in political campaigns.147 The Court dismissed
the claim of all appellants (with the exception of George P. Poole, the only
appellant who had actually violated the Hatch Act) for lack of
jurisdiction.148 It explained that, to exercise jurisdiction, plaintiffs had to
allege not simply the “general threat” that officials might enforce the Act
against them, but a “direct threat of punishment” for violating that law.149
According to the Court, any opinion to redress a “hypothetical threat,” as
opposed to an actual controversy, would be merely an “advisory opinion.”150
But Mitchell’s characterization of a decision where the probability of
injury was low as an advisory opinion is unwarranted. Resolving a claim
based on a low probability of injury does have a real-world effect. Even
when the threat of injury is extremely low, a judicial decision targeted at
that threat might reduce, or even remove, the threat. Consider the situation
where a person faces a 0.005% chance of cancer because of a factory’s
emissions. Although the chance of developing cancer from the emissions is
low, an injunction ordering the factory to reduce its emissions will still
reduce the plaintiff’s chance of developing cancer from those emissions.
Moreover, the expansive definition of an advisory opinion relied on by
Mitchell is too broad.151 Mitchell does not explain why a decision addressing
a remote threat of injury constitutes an advisory opinion. Instead, it simply
equates advisory opinions with lack of standing because of a low

144
See Evan Tsen Lee, Deconstitutionalizing Justiciability: The Example of Mootness, 105 HARV.
L. REV. 603, 643–45 (1992) (noting different uses of the term “advisory opinion”).
145
See, e.g., Jennifer Mason McAward, Congress’s Power to Block Enforcement of Federal Court
Orders, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1319, 1344 (2008) (arguing that “judicial intervention” that has “no real-world
effect” is “tantamount to an advisory opinion”).
146
330 U.S. 75, 89 (1947).
147
Id. at 81–82.
148
Id. at 83, 91.
149
Id. at 88.
150
Id. at 89–90.
151
See Lee, supra note 144, at 643–44.
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probability of injury.152 Indeed, in subsequent opinions, the Supreme Court
itself has interpreted Mitchell as a standing decision.153 Presumably, if the
Court deemed that the threat of injury was sufficiently substantial to support
standing, it would not have determined that a decision would constitute an
advisory opinion. Thus, Mitchell does not establish a separate jurisdictional
restriction for advisory opinions; rather, it limits jurisdiction only to the
extent there is not standing.
Indeed, as Professor Evan Tsen Lee has persuasively demonstrated, the
restriction on advisory opinions properly encompasses only two
situations.154 The first is when a court issues a judgment that is subject to
review by another branch.155 This form of the advisory opinion derives from
the 1792 decision in Hayburn’s Case.156 That case involved a statutory
pension scheme for disabled Revolutionary War veterans.157 Under the
statute, a disabled veteran submitted an application for benefits to the
federal court.158 The court was to determine whether the veteran was entitled
to benefits, but instead of ordering benefits itself, it was to transmit its
conclusions to the Secretary of War, who made the final decision whether
to award benefits.159 Sitting on circuit, Chief Justice Jay and Justices Iredell,
Cushing, Wilson, and Blair explained that the scheme violated separation of
powers by undermining the independence of the judiciary.160 Since
Hayburn’s Case, the Supreme Court has consistently held that the
Constitution forbids courts from issuing judgments subject to revision by
another body.161 This first form of advisory opinion does not pose an
152

Cf. id. at 645 (criticizing the Supreme Court’s use of the term “advisory opinion” merely on the
basis of lack of standing).
153
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983) (relying on Mitchell for the proposition
that a plaintiff has standing only if he faces an immediate threat of injury); see also Golden v. Zwickler,
394 U.S. 103, 109–10 (1969) (general interest in constitutionality of law is not an actual controversy).
Even cases predating Mitchell that address insufficient injury speak in terms of standing instead of
advisory opinions. In Massachusetts v. Mellon, for example, the Court concluded that it lacked
jurisdiction to hear a challenge to a statute by an individual unaffected by the statute on the ground that
the plaintiff must show “that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct
injury as the result of its enforcement.” 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923); see also Ex parte Lévitt, 302 U.S.
633, 633–34 (1937) (per curiam) (using similar language to reject a challenge to the appointment of
Justice Black).
154
Lee, supra note 144, at 644–51 (explaining why advisory opinions do not encompass all
justiciability doctrines); see also Frankfurter, supra note 82, at 1004 (limiting advisory opinions to
situations in which the courts rule prematurely on the constitutionality of a statute).
155
Lee, supra note 144, at 645–46.
156
2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792).
157
Id. at 409–10.
158
Act of Mar. 23, 1792, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 243, 243–44 (repealed in part and amended by Act of Feb.
28, 1793, ch. 17, 1 Stat. 324, 324–325).
159
2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 410 n.†; see also 1 Stat. at 244.
160
The opinion is reproduced in a footnote in Hayburn’s Case. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 410 n.†.
161
See, e.g., Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113 (1948)
(“Judgments within the powers vested in courts by the Judiciary Article of the Constitution may not
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obstacle to cases alleging a low probability of injury; the likelihood of an
injury is irrelevant to whether the President or Congress can review a
judicial decision.
The second type of advisory opinion is one in which a court provides
advice to Congress on potential legislation before it is enacted or to the
President regarding how a law should be interpreted before it is enforced.162
The Supreme Court first recognized that such opinions were forbidden in
1793 when it refused to answer President Washington’s questions about
France’s rights under various treaties.163
This second form of advisory opinion potentially poses an obstacle to
the exercise of federal court jurisdiction based on a small risk of harm.
There is always a chance, though it may be miniscule, that a legislature will
enact a statute that could injure an individual. Allowing absolutely any risk
of injury to support standing would mean that an individual could challenge
any potential future law before its enactment. Issuing an injunction against
the enforcement of such a potential statute would amount to pre-enactment
review and, consequently, would violate the restriction on advisory
opinions. But this does not mean that federal courts generally cannot hear
claims alleging small risks of harm; rather, it means only that federal courts
lack jurisdiction over pre-enactment challenges to legislation.
Unlike challenges to legislation before enactment, the restriction on
providing advice to the President does not bar jurisdiction over a claim
because it alleges a small threat of injury.164 This restriction does not
generally prohibit courts from providing pre-enforcement interpretations of
laws; it merely prevents the President from seeking such interpretations.165
Private parties do not face a similar limitation. Federal courts routinely
interpret statutes before they have been enforced at the instigation of private
parties.166 Thus, this form of advisory opinion does not depend on the
lawfully be revised, overturned or refused faith and credit by another Department of Government.”);
United States v. O’Grady, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 641, 647–48 (1874) (“Judicial jurisdiction implies the
power to hear and determine a cause, and . . . Congress cannot subject the judgments of the Supreme
Court to the re-examination and revision of any other tribunal . . . .”); see also Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm,
Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 225–27 (1995) (forbidding Congress from directing reopening of decided cases).
162
Lee, supra note 144, at 644–45, 647; see also Frankfurter, supra note 83, at 1004.
163
Letter from Chief Justice Jay and Associate Justices to President Washington (Aug. 8, 1793), in
3 CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY 1782–1793, at 488 (Henry P. Johnston ed.,
1891).
164
Moreover, this restriction on advisory opinions has no bearing on many claims of lowprobability injuries. That is because this form of advisory opinion implicates only those laws that the
Executive branch enforces. For laws that the President has no role in enforcing―such as state laws and
federal laws creating private causes of action―the prohibition on advisory opinions poses no barrier.
165
Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 827–28 (1997) (indicating that the President and legislators
cannot resort to the courts for clarification of law).
166
See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733, 2742 (2011) (striking down
California law regulating the sale or rental of violent video games based on a pre-enforcement
challenge).
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quality of the injury. Rather, it turns on who is bringing suit—the President
or a private individual—regardless of the type of injury alleged.167
To be sure, allowing suits based on low-probability injuries may
require a court to interpret a law before it is enforced, as in the situation
where an individual brings a declaratory judgment action seeking an
interpretation of a law that is unlikely to be enforced against him. But
unlike ruling on legislation before enactment, which poses the threat that
the courts will interfere in the legislative process, providing interpretations
based on hypothetical disputes does not present serious separation-ofpowers concerns. Interpreting the law, unlike legislating, is the province of
the judiciary.168 For this reason, courts have repeatedly concluded that
Article III does not pose an absolute bar to interpretations of laws preenforcement in the course of issuing injunctions and declaratory
judgments.169 A suit alleging a low probability of injury is not different in
kind from these actions: both involve the courts providing an interpretation
before the executive acts.
One might try to argue that low-probability injuries are somehow
different because they call for interpretations based on more hypothetical
facts. But courts often render interpretations of both statutes and the
Constitution based on hypothetical facts.170 The most striking example is in
an overbreadth challenge to a law on the ground that it violates the First
Amendment. For such challenges, the court determines the constitutionality
of the statute by considering whether the statute might impair the First

167
Although the Constitution does not prohibit courts from rendering opinions on hypothetical
facts, there are several more practical reasons for courts to avoid rendering interpretations in
hypothetical cases, including ensuring that there is a concrete factual background against which the
court resolves the legal question and to preserve judicial resources. See infra Part IV; see also
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 45, § 2.2, at 49. Both of these considerations are prudential, and may be
outweighed by other considerations in particular cases or may simply be overridden by Congress. Thus,
courts could more sensibly account for these considerations in a discretionary test, as detailed below in
Part IV.
168
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”).
169
See Vicksburg Waterworks Co. v. Vicksburg, 185 U.S. 65, 82 (1902) (holding that a threatened
injury presented a case because “one of the most valuable features of equity jurisdiction[] [is] to
anticipate and prevent a threatened injury, where the damages would be insufficient or irreparable”); see
also, e.g., Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1329–31 (2010)
(considering an as-applied pre-enforcement challenge brought under the First Amendment).
170
See, e.g., United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 579 F.3d 989, 1006–07 (9th Cir.
2009) (providing a “guidepost” for future cases), revised and superseded, 621 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2010)
(en banc); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 622–23 (1961) (explaining theories of coerced
confession unrelated to the case). Likewise, courts routinely render interpretations of statutes and the
Constitution when it is unnecessary to do so. See, e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009)
(suggesting that courts resolve whether officials violated the Constitution in suits brought under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 even when doing so may be unnecessary because of qualified immunity); Marbury, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) at 154–73 (resolving merits of mandamus petition despite finding no jurisdiction).
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Amendment rights of other hypothetical people not before the court.171 The
fact that courts do so demonstrates that Article III does not prohibit the
practice.
In short, the restriction on advisory opinions does not bar the
adjudication of low-threat injuries generally. To the extent it does so at all,
it is only in the context of challenges to hypothetical legislation.
C. Separation of Powers
The objection about advisory opinions is just one example of a broader
concern that extending standing to low-probability injuries potentially
violates separation of powers. Under the Court’s current theory of
separation of powers, the Legislative and Executive branches have the task
of establishing social policy through the enactment and enforcement of
laws.172 The courts, by contrast, do not have a similar policy role; their
function is to resolve the rights of individuals.173 Given this understanding
of the appropriate allocation of powers, one might argue that extending
jurisdiction to cases in which a plaintiff has alleged only a miniscule risk of
injury will lead to courts resolving policy matters more properly answered
by the other branches.174
This separation-of-powers concern has significantly influenced
standing doctrine.175 For example, the Supreme Court has refused to
recognize standing for generalized grievances common to all members of
the public—such as harm arising from the government’s failure to obey the
law176—based on the conclusion that the Legislature or Executive is the
171

See, e.g., Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003) (justifying overbreadth on the ground that
the costs of unconstitutional limitations on speech of those not before the court warrant suspending all
enforcement of the law); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769–70 (1982) (stating that a statute is
constitutionally overbroad if it affects a “substantial” amount of protected conduct).
172
Indeed, as then-Professor Frankfurter noted, the consideration of probabilities is central to the
legislative process. Frankfurter, supra note 83, at 1005 (“[L]egislation to a considerable extent must
necessarily be based on probabilities, on hopes and fears, and not on demonstration.”). In enacting a law,
legislators must predict the need for and consequences of that legislation.
173
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576 (1992). Although courts may create policy
through their decisions, they may do so only in the course of resolving a dispute about rights.
174
Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459, 476–77 (2008). Whether all
individuals will have access to courts depends on the generality of the definition of an injury. If an
injury is defined generally, more people will be likely to face that injury. For example, if the injury is
discrimination on the basis of race, all people may face that injury since anyone may be discriminated
against on the basis of his race. But if the injury is narrowly defined to be discrimination against Asians,
only Asians face that injury―though even in that case, standing is arguably appropriate since there is
some chance, however small, that a white person could suffer discrimination based on the wrong
conclusion that he is Asian.
175
Id.
176
See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 577–78 (concluding that a private individual does not have standing
to challenge executive’s failure to obey law); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418
U.S. 208, 220–21 (1974) (denying standing to individuals challenging congressmen holding office while
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appropriate body to redress an injury shared by the entire public.177
Similarly, the Court has held that taxpayer status alone cannot confer
standing, explaining that to extend standing to all taxpayers would convert
the courts into fora for anyone seeking to challenge any government policy,
thereby resulting in the courts becoming the overseers of the political
branches.178
Under the Court’s vision of separation of powers, the role of the courts
is to vindicate the interests of individuals who suffer distinct, personalized
injuries.179 As Justice Scalia has explained, when a majority of people share
an injury, that group may resort to the political process.180 Judicial relief is
appropriate only to protect minorities who cannot rely on the political
process.181
One might think that this vision of separation of powers demands that
standing should not extend to small risks of injury. After all, everyone has
at least some probability of facing an injury; thus, if the probability
threshold for standing is set sufficiently low, everyone has standing to
challenge any action.182 But this concern does not justify the minimum-risk
requirement.
being commissioned in the military in violation of Art. I, § 6, cl. 2); United States v. Richardson, 418
U.S. 166, 177 (1974) (holding that a private individual lacks standing to challenge Congress’s failure to
publish the CIA’s expenditures as required under Art. I, § 9, cl. 7); see also Elliott, supra note 174
(discussing this line of cases).
177
See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 577 (arguing that granting standing would undermine the President’s
power to take care that the laws are enforced); Richardson, 418 U.S. at 179 (noting that interest in
government obedience to the law “is committed to the surveillance of Congress, and ultimately to the
political process”); Newman v. United States ex rel. Frizzell, 238 U.S. 537, 547–48 (1915) (stating that
although “every citizen and every taxpayer is interested in the enforcement of law . . . that general
interest is not a private but a public interest . . . to be represented by the Attorney General or the District
Attorney”).
178
Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 593, 599–600 (2007); Massachusetts
v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 486–87 (1923) (holding that taxpayers lacked standing under the Tenth
Amendment to challenge federal funding of health programs for mothers and children).
179
Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers,
17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 895–97 (1983).
180
Id.
181
Id. Justice Scalia’s defense of standing law fails to account for all of the Court’s decisions, for
the Court has invoked separation of powers in denying standing for concrete and particularized injuries.
In Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984), for example, the Court held that black plaintiffs did not have
standing based on the stigma resulting from discrimination against other blacks. Id. at 761. Although
stigmatization is a real injury, the Court explained that recognition of stigma as sufficient injury would
extend standing to “all members of a racial group,” id. at 754, converting the courts into “virtually
continuing monitors of the wisdom and soundness” of policy choices, id. at 759–60 (quoting Laird v.
Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 15 (1972)). Likewise, in Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for
Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, (1982), the Court rejected standing based on
psychological distress caused by the government’s illegal conduct, although that distress was a very real
injury. Id. at 484.
182
See Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 513 F.3d 234, 242 (D.C. Cir.
2008) (Sentelle, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that allowing standing based on probabilistic
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Even under the modern Court’s vision of separation of powers, the
restriction on low-risk injuries is unwarranted. First, even for an injury that
is unlikely to occur, different groups face different risks of suffering that
injury. One group may face an extremely low probability of injury, but that
probability may still be substantially higher than the probability of injury
faced by other individuals. For example, people who live in a town near
high-tension power lines face a higher probability―though the probability
is still low―of developing cancer from those power lines than those who
live further away. Although the town residents face small risks of injury,
their risk might still be significant when compared to the threat facing the
general population. Because of this difference in relative risk, the town
residents constitute a minority. The minimum-risk requirement therefore
closes the court doors to those who are in a minority in the sense used by
Justice Scalia.183
Further, the fact that the minimum-risk requirement may extend
standing to virtually everyone for all injuries does not conflict with the
Court’s separation of powers theory. As the Court has recognized, some
widespread injuries may support standing. For example, an individual who
suffers a burned arm in a fire has standing even if that fire also burned
thousands of others.184 Although the injury is widespread, standing is
appropriate because each burn victim suffers a particularized, personal
injury.185 This analysis should extend to risk of injury. If the threatened
injury is particularized, the risk of that injury is also particularized. Each
plaintiff faces a personal interest in preventing the threatened injury. Just as
a plaintiff who develops cancer as a result of tortious conduct that also
affects thousands of others has suffered a personal injury, so too a plaintiff
who faces a risk of cancer from that same tort has a personalized injury—
the risk of developing cancer.
Even to the extent that prohibiting standing for low-risk injuries does
protect some aspect of separation of powers insofar as it restricts the
judiciary’s ability to act, this prohibition undermines other aspects of
separation of powers by impairing legislative powers. The Constitution
charges Congress with creating rights through legislative enactments. The
minimum-risk requirement, however, restricts this congressional power to
harm results in courts “looking more and more like legislatures rather than courts”), supplemented by
513 F.3d 234 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (per curiam).
183
This is not to say that only those who are in this minority should have standing; to the contrary,
all those who face a risk of harm should have standing. Rather, the point is that the minimum-risk
requirement does not achieve the separation-of-power goals articulated by the Court because it bars suit
by those in the minority. It is particularly important to recognize this point given that people routinely
face different risks of suffering the same harm because of their daily activities, geography, genetic
predisposition, and other factors. There accordingly will almost always be some group of people facing
a greater risk than the general populace.
184
FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998); accord id. at 36 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
185
Id.
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create judicially enforceable rights; courts will recognize a right only when
there is a sufficiently high probability of the violation of that right.186
Because a right has practical effect only to the extent that it is vindicated,187
the minimum-risk requirement functionally redefines the scope of rights.
For practical purposes, the minimum-risk requirement limits the scope of
the rights that Congress may create. Under the requirement, Congress
cannot pursue a policy of preventing extremely low-risk injuries through
private causes of action; courts will not entertain such actions unless they
cross the judicially created Article III threshold of risk.
Likewise, the minimum-risk requirement interferes with administrative
programs. Congress often tasks agencies with minimizing the risks of
particular types of harm and leaves it to the courts to ensure that the
agencies fulfill this goal.188 The Administrative Procedure Act and other
statutes afford individuals the right to challenge agency actions that fall
short.189 This scheme reduces agency power by empowering the public to
seek judicial enforcement and provides an independent body—the
judiciary—to ensure that the agency acts in accordance with its delegated
power.190 Prohibiting standing for low risks of injury undermines this
scheme. An agency may promulgate a regulation that reduces the risk of
harm, but not to the degree intended by Congress. By refusing to extend
standing to these low-level risks prohibited by Congress, the courts displace

186
It is not uncommon for Congress to regulate conduct to prevent low-risk injuries; indeed,
because of cognitive biases, Congress may regulate to prevent low-risk events—such as airplane
crashes—more readily than to prevent high-risk events—such as heart disease. See generally CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON: SAFETY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT (2002) (discussing the rationality
of risk regulation).
187
See In re The Western Maid, 257 U.S. 419, 433 (1922) (“Legal obligations that exist but cannot
be enforced are ghosts that are seen in the law but that are elusive to the grasp.”); Daryl J. Levinson,
Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857, 858 (1999) (“Rights are
dependent on remedies not just for their application to the real world, but for their scope, shape, and
very existence.”).
188
The Safe Drinking Water Act is an example. It requires the EPA to set “maximum contaminant
level goals” for water contaminants at a level at which no known adverse health consequences will
occur, 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(4)(A) (2006), and then to establish regulations for each contaminant
designed to achieve these goals to the extent feasible, id. § 300g-1(b)(4)(B). Of course, Congress may
direct an agency to disregard trivial risks. See Cass R. Sunstein, Is OSHA Unconstitutional?, 94 VA. L.
REV. 1407, 1408–09 (2008).
189
See Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237, 243 (1946) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 702
(2006)) (generally authorizing review of administrative actions); see also, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1848 (2006)
(authorizing review of actions of the Federal Reserve Board); 29 U.S.C. § 160 (2006) (authorizing
review of actions of the NLRB).
190
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE
143 (1990) (“Broad delegations of power to regulatory agencies, questionable in light of the grant of
legislative power to Congress in Article I of the Constitution, have been allowed largely on the
assumption that courts would be available to ensure agency fidelity to whatever statutory directives have
been issued.”).
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Congress’s legislative choices by permitting risks that Congress has deemed
intolerable.
Finally, the limits on probabilistic standing exacerbate inequalities in
our democratic system that separation of powers was designed to prevent.
One function of the courts is to serve as a forum for those who lack political
power.191 But the limitations on standing set up the opposite scheme.
Regulated entities often have substantially more influence in Congress than
does the general public,192 and they have standing to challenge regulations
to which they are subject because those regulations affect their bottom
line.193 It is the general public that faces standing problems because of the
restrictions on low probabilities of injuries.
D. Caseload
A fourth objection to expanding standing to all risks of injury is that it
would open the floodgates of litigation and overburden the federal dockets.
Many activities marginally increase virtually everybody’s risk of suffering a
particular type of harm, and consequently anyone could bring suit to
challenge those activities.
Although expanding standing may indeed increase the federal docket,
that increase is unlikely to be substantial. To start, the expansion of
standing doctrine would not necessarily result in significantly more suits.
Common sense and experience suggest that many people who already have
standing to bring suit do not do so. Individuals often privately resolve their
disputes,194 or they simply live with the wrong done to them on the theory
that the costs of bringing suit are not worthwhile.195 In a substantial number
191
See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
73–104 (1980) (arguing that judicial review should be used in cases where the democratic process has
failed).
192
See Noah D. Hall, Toward a *ew Horizontal Federalism: Interstate Water Management in the
Great Lakes Region, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 405, 455 (2006) (noting that representatives of industry have
a sphere of influence in Congress). The explanation is that regulated industries have greater resources to
lobby and otherwise influence government, and they suffer less from collective action problems than the
general public.
193
See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561–62 (1992) (“[If] the plaintiff is himself an
object of the action (or forgone action) at issue . . . there is ordinarily little question that the action or
inaction has caused him injury, and that a judgment preventing or requiring the action will redress it.”).
194
Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Shattering *egotiation Myths: Empirical Evidence on the
Effectiveness of *egotiation Style, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 143, 147 (2002) (noting a prelitigation
settlement rate of 95%); see also ALAN SCOTT RAU, EDWARD F. SHERMAN & SCOTT PEPPET,
PROCESSES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE ROLE OF LAWYERS 13–21 (4th ed. 2006) (noting an
empirical study that lists trial rates for certain areas of law, such as civil cases and prisoners suits, which
range from 0.9% to 3.7%).
195
This is the theory underlying class actions: individuals will not bring suit because the costs of
the litigation outweigh the expected rewards. John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney:
The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative
Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 685 (1986).
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of public-law challenges brought by an individual, the individual plaintiff
himself did not seek to bring suit; instead, an interest group wishing to
pursue the litigation found an individual with standing and encouraged that
individual to bring suit.196 Indeed, given the size of our population, current
standing doctrine poses no real impediment to litigation to those who wish
to bring suit.197 Thus, expanding standing may not have any real effect on
the size of the federal docket.
In addition, although more people would have standing under the anyrisk-of-harm standard, many will nevertheless be discouraged from bringing
suit because courts are likely to dismiss their cases on the merits. One
reason why courts currently do not face a large number of cases alleging
small risks of harm: plaintiffs undoubtedly do not bring such suits because
they expect that their suits will be dismissed for lack of standing.198 Similar
reasoning extends to the merits. The standards for awarding prospective
relief often pose obstacles for those facing only small risks of harm. To
obtain an injunction, for example, a plaintiff must demonstrate not only that
the law prohibits the defendant’s conduct, but also that the plaintiff faces a
likelihood of suffering irreparable harm if relief is not immediately
granted.199 Similarly, courts have discretion whether to grant declaratory
relief, and one of the considerations relevant to the exercise of that
discretion is the likelihood that the plaintiff will suffer harm if relief is
withheld.200 A substantive standard itself might also preclude claims based
on low-probability risks. A challenge to legislation evaluated under the
rational basis test, for example, is likely to fail if the basis for the plaintiff’s
challenge is that the legislation poses a potential, but small, risk, because
196

In District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), for example, the Cato Institute sought
out the plaintiffs to bring suit challenging the handgun restrictions in the District of Columbia. See
Supreme Court Overturns D.C. Gun Ban; What *ext?, NPR NEWS & NOTES (Jul. 3, 2008), http://pd.npr.
org/anon.npr-mp3/npr/newsnotes/2008/07/20080703_newsnotes_01.mp3.
197
See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281,
1305 (1976) (“[I]t is never hard to find [a] . . . plaintiff to raise the issues.”); Mark Tushnet, “Meet the
*ew Boss”: The *ew Judicial Center, 83 N.C. L. REV. 1205, 1213 (2005) (stating that current standing
doctrine “will rarely impede a well-advised litigant seeking to challenge almost any statute enacted by
Congress or action taken by an executive official”).
198
Cf. Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 904 (2008) (rejecting arguments that the potential for many
suits requires a more stringent doctrine of res judicata, because, even if res judicata does not apply, there
is a “human tendency not to waste money” that “deter[s] the bringing of suits” that are bound to lose
(quoting DAVID L. SHAPIRO, CIVIL PROCEDURE: PRECLUSION IN CIVIL ACTIONS 97 (2001))).
199
See Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2760 (2010) (noting that a court
may award an injunction only “to guard against any present or imminent risk of likely irreparable
harm”); Bokulich v. Jury Comm’n of Greene Cnty., 394 U.S. 97, 99 (1969) (holding that injunctions are
appropriate only “to prevent irreparable injury which is clear and imminent” (quoting Douglas v. City of
Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 163 (1943) (internal quotation mark omitted)).
200
See, e.g., Fieger v. Mich. Sup. Ct., 553 F.3d 955, 974 (6th Cir. 2009) (vacating declaratory
judgment because of lack of imminent harm); El Dia, Inc. v. Hernandez Colon, 963 F.2d 488, 498 (1st
Cir. 1992) (reversing grant of declaratory judgment when the plaintiff failed to demonstrate high
likelihood of harm).
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the legislature could rationally conclude that the benefits of the legislation
offset the small risks it creates.201 Because courts are unlikely to award
prospective relief for small risks of harm, plaintiffs are bound to be less
likely to bring suit.
In any event, to the extent that the federal judiciary faces the need to
reduce its caseload, it can more effectively and transparently accomplish
that goal through the prudential doctrines discussed in the next section.
IV. A PRUDENTIAL APPROACH
What should be apparent by now is that Article III should extend to all
claims in which a plaintiff challenges conduct that increases the threat of a
future injury so long as a court order would remove that increase in risk.
Doing so would make better sense of the text of Article III, simplify the law
of standing, and improve the legitimacy of standing determinations.
Still, there is reason to resist expanding Article III standing in this way.
After all, the minimum-risk requirement is not worthless. Although not
compelled by Article III, it arguably helps to avoid unnecessary judicial
interference with the political branches, preserves judicial resources by
limiting the number of potential plaintiffs, and promotes better
decisionmaking by ensuring that interested parties—the ones who are in the
best position to make strong arguments—are the ones who make it into
court.
For this reason, courts should develop prudential rules limiting
standing in cases alleging small risks of injury. Although Article III
authorizes federal courts to hear those claims, these prudential doctrines
would allow courts to decline to hear some of those suits. Allowing courts
to decline jurisdiction in these cases would hardly be unprecedented. Courts
have long recognized prudential limitations on standing202—for example,
courts have created prudential doctrines limiting standing for plaintiffs
asserting the rights of third parties203—that allow them to decline
jurisdiction because of concerns about the potential negative consequences
of exercising jurisdiction.204
Under this proposed prudential test, a court would determine whether
to hear a claim alleging a low risk of injury based on a number of factors,
such as the plaintiff’s interest in having the case heard, the risk to
201
See, e.g., Britell v. United States, 372 F.3d 1370, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (rejecting challenge to
abortion funding ban despite increase in health risk for some mothers).
202
See Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 298–90 (2008) (Roberts, C. J.,
dissenting) (identifying various prudential forms of standing); Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow,
542 U.S. 1, 11 (2004); see generally RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER
& DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S: THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 170
(6th ed. 2009) (summarizing this area of law).
203
Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 129–30 (2004).
204
See David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 580–85 (1985).
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separation of powers or federalism, and the amount of information available
to the court to render decision. Needless to say, courts should be more
willing to intervene when the plaintiff has a significant interest at stake and
less so when judicial intervention threatens separation of powers or
federalism, or when there is insufficient information for a court to render an
intelligent decision.205
As suggested earlier, there is reason to think that courts already often
base standing decisions on these considerations.206 But this prudential test
would require courts to consider these factors explicitly, instead of
implicitly in a minimum-risk test. Explicit discussion of these
considerations would promote judicial legitimacy by increasing
transparency in decisionmaking.207 It would also lead to a more coherent
law of standing because it would facilitate better understanding among the
lower courts for the superior courts’ decisions. Likewise, explicit discussion
would foster better decisionmaking not only by enabling parties to offer
arguments actually tailored to the court’s concerns, but also by forcing
judges to engage in the process of articulating the factors underlying their
decision whether to exercise jurisdiction.208
What follows is a discussion of several factors that courts should
consider in determining whether to exercise jurisdiction over a claim
asserting a small risk of injury. Some of these considerations point in favor
of the exercise of jurisdiction and others counsel against that exercise.
Although the list is not exhaustive, it illustrates the kinds of matters courts
should consider in determining whether to exercise jurisdiction.
A. *ature of the Violation
Courts should be more willing to intervene when the plaintiff’s interest
at stake is significant. The plaintiff’s interest depends on both the severity
of the threatened harm and the likelihood that the injury will occur. When
the threatened harm is substantial, courts should be more willing to
205
Others have proposed prudential doctrines of abstention to replace standing. See Elliott, supra
note 174, at 508; Louis L. Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Private Actions, 75 HARV. L. REV.
255, 304–05 (1961); Louis L. Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 HARV. L.
REV. 1265, 1296 (1961); Jonathan R. Siegel, A Theory of Justiciability, 86 TEX. L. REV. 73, 129–38
(2007); Mark V. Tushnet, The *ew Law of Standing: A Plea for Abandonment, 62 CORNELL L. REV.
663, 700 (1977). This Article expands on those prudential tests by adding consideration of the plaintiff’s
interest.
206
See supra notes 110–13 and accompanying text.
207
See F. Andrew Hessick & Samuel P. Jordan, Setting the Size of the Supreme Court, 41 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 645, 661 (2009) (“Transparency further promotes legitimacy by providing the public with greater
access to the decision-making process to satisfy itself of the Court’s candor.”).
208
See Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings,
62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1375 (1995) (noting how the drafting process forces judges to confront the
case and often leads judges to “modulate, transfer, or even switch an originally intended rationale or
result”).

92

106:55 (2012)

Probabilistic Standing

intervene despite a low probability of that harm occurring. For example,
when death is the threatened harm, the required risk should be relatively
low. By contrast, when the threatened harm is less significant—such as the
possibility that a person’s yard will be exposed to a benign fungus—the
required probability should be higher.
There are two reasons why courts should be more willing to exercise
jurisdiction for serious harms. The first is moral. There is a sense that
society should prevent harm when doing so would not entail substantial
burdens.209 By this logic, the greater the threatened harm, the stronger the
obligation to prevent that harm. Thus, when a particularly important interest
is at stake, courts should more readily exercise jurisdiction. Second,
consideration of the nature of the harm allows courts to allocate judicial
resources more efficiently. Courts do not have the resources to address all
potential injuries.210 They accordingly should devote judicial resources to
those harms that pose the highest cost to society.
In addition to the gravity of the factual harm that plaintiffs might
suffer, the consideration of whether to exercise jurisdiction should include
the nature of the rights that might be violated.211 Courts should be more
willing to exercise jurisdiction when important rights are at stake.212 The
role of the court is to protect rights.213 That role becomes more essential as
209

Joel Feinberg, The Moral and Legal Responsibility of the Bad Samaritan, 3 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS
56, 67 (1984) (“[W]here minimal effort is required to prevent harm, the moral duty to prevent it seems
every bit as stringent as the negative duty not to inflict that same harm directly.”); William W. Fisher &
Talha Syed, Global Justice in Healthcare: Developing Drugs for the Developing World, 40 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 581, 649 (2007) (noting the “positive moral duty to prevent severe harm or to alleviate severe
suffering that is within one’s sphere of influence”).
210
See, e.g., Robert L. Pushaw, Jr., Limiting Article III Standing to “Accidental” Plaintiffs: Lessons
from Environmental and Animal Law Cases, 45 GA. L. REV. 1, 3 (2010) (“[S]tanding improves
efficiency by allocating scarce judicial resources to the most pressing cases.”).
211
It is unclear whether the violation of a legal right is essential for standing. Some decisions
suggest that standing requires both that the plaintiff has suffered a factual harm and that the harm be the
consequence of a violation of a right. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819 (1997) (noting that, for
standing, the injury must involve “an invasion of a legally protected interest” (quoting Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Other decisions
suggest that factual harm alone will support standing. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 160, 166
(1997) (granting standing based solely on the fact that the plaintiffs would suffer the adverse
consequence of less water without mention of riparian rights); Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v.
Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152–54 (1970) (basing standing on an economic injury without regard to any legal
interest).
212
The Supreme Court has claimed that there is no hierarchy of constitutional rights. See Valley
Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 484 (1982).
But the Court itself has created a hierarchy in its decisions about incorporation by distinguishing
between fundamental and nonfundamental constitutional rights and the levels of scrutiny to apply.
Similarly, the exceptions to general doctrines that the Court has recognized for some rights—such as the
overbreadth doctrine for First Amendment challenges—suggest that the Court deems certain rights more
important. In any event, one may easily draw a line between constitutional and nonconstitutional when
determining the importance of rights.
213
Hessick, supra note 17, at 325.
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the importance of the right increases. Thus, courts should be more willing
to find standing for claims alleging potential violations of rights that we
deem fundamental, such as the right to a petit jury in a criminal case,214 than
for rights that are not fundamental, such as the right to make peremptory
challenges to potential jurors.215 Similarly, insofar as one of the principal
functions of the judiciary is to protect the rights of the minority who cannot
rely on the political process, courts should be particularly solicitous of
claims against the government seeking to enforce rights necessary to
participate in the political process.216
Several cases endorse this approach.217 For example, to have standing
to challenge a criminal law outlawing conduct in which the plaintiff wishes
to engage, the plaintiff usually must show that he faces a threat of
prosecution if he engages in the activity.218 But in the First Amendment
context, courts have dispensed with that showing. All the plaintiff must
show is that the law targets the conduct that the plaintiff wishes to
undertake.219 Similarly, courts appear to have relaxed the standing
requirement in cases involving the right to abortion. In Doe v. Bolton, the
Court held that doctors had standing to challenge criminal abortion statutes,
“despite the fact that the record does not disclose that any one of [the
doctors] has been prosecuted, or threatened with prosecution.”220

214
See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (“[T]rial by jury in criminal cases is
fundamental to the American scheme of justice . . . .”).
215
See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 57 (1992) (“[P]eremptory challenges are not
constitutionally protected fundamental rights; rather, they are but one state-created means to the
constitutional end of an impartial jury and a fair trial.”).
216
ELY, supra note 191, at 73–104 (arguing that judicial review should be used in cases where the
democratic process has failed).
217
13B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 3532.5, at 551–72 (3d ed. 2008) (“As often happens with questions of justiciability,
results are shaped by an often unarticulated sense of the importance of the rights claimed and by an
uncertain pragmatic assessment of the reality of the plaintiff’s claimed need for guidance.”).
218
E.g., Mink v. Suthers, 482 F.3d 1244, 1257 (10th Cir. 2007) (dismissing challenge to criminal
statute for lack of standing because plaintiff faced “no credible threat of prosecution”); Reed v.
Giarrusso, 462 F.2d 706, 710–11 (5th Cir. 1972).
219
Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. 383, 392–93 (1988) (“That requirement is met
here, as the law is aimed directly at plaintiffs, who, if their interpretation of the statute is correct, will
have to take significant and costly compliance measures or risk criminal prosecution . . . . Further, the
alleged danger of this statute is, in large measure, one of self-censorship; a harm that can be realized
even without an actual prosecution.”); see also, e.g., Cal. Pro-Life Council, Inc. v. Getman, 328 F.3d
1088, 1095 (9th Cir. 2003); Majors v. Abell, 317 F.3d 719, 721 (7th Cir. 2003) (“But if it arguably
covers it, and so may deter constitutionally protected expression because most people are frightened of
violating criminal statutes especially when the gains are slight, as they would be for people seeking only
to make a political point and not themselves political operatives, there is standing.”), certifying questions
to 792 N.E.2d 22 (Ind. 2003); cf. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 15 (1972) (no standing where the law does
not target the chilled activity).
220
410 U.S. 179, 188 (1973).
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To be sure, these decisions have approached the standing issue in terms
of Article III, not prudential, standing: they have concluded that the more
important the right, the more likely a dispute presents a case or controversy
under Article III. But it is far more sensible to frame the issue as one of
prudential standing. Whether a dispute constitutes a case or controversy
should not vary with the right. A case is a dispute subject to judicial
resolution, and whether a court can resolve a dispute does not depend on
which right is at stake; rather, it depends on whether the right, whatever it
may be, has been or will be violated.221 By contrast, treating the importance
of the right as a prudential consideration allows courts to exercise discretion
in exercising jurisdiction.
B. Comity
Although concerns about separation of powers do not warrant
interpreting Article III to exclude all low-probability threats of harm,
comity—that is, the desire to avoid conflict with state governments and the
other branches of the federal government222—might justify a court’s refusal
to hear some of those claims.223 Comity routinely informs courts’ decisions
about whether to exercise jurisdiction.224 These same concerns should
inform courts’ decisions whether to intervene in cases alleging low-risk
injuries.
Comity concerns are most significant when resolving a claim would
require a court to interfere with the function of another branch. Take, for
example, a claim asking a court to pass on the constitutionality of
legislative enactments. Declaring a statute unconstitutional directly
conflicts with the legislature’s task of implementing policy through
legislation. It also signifies disrespect of the legislature’s constitutional
judgment because legislative enactment implicitly carries the legislature’s
determination that the law is constitutional.225 When a claim alleging a low
risk of injury raises these concerns, a court should be more hesitant to
intervene.

221
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (“[W]here there is a legal right,
there is also a legal remedy[,] by suit or action at law, whenever that right is invaded.” (quoting 3
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *23) (internal quotation mark omitted)).
222
See Turner Entm’t Co. v. Degeto Film GmbH, 25 F.3d 1512, 1519 n.10 (11th Cir. 1994) (noting
commentators have defined comity using terms such as “courtesy, politeness, convenience or goodwill”
(quoting Joel R. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 3 (1991))).
223
Levin v. Commerce Energy, Inc., 130 S. Ct. 2323, 2336 (2010) (“Comity . . . is a prudential
doctrine.”).
224
See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (invoking comity in abstaining from ruling
on legality of state criminal proceedings); Wright v. Associated Ins. Cos., 29 F.3d 1244, 1252 (7th Cir.
1994) (noting comity as consideration in determining whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction).
225
See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000); F. Andrew Hessick, Rethinking the
Presumption of Constitutionality, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1447, 1462–63 (2010).
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Comity also counsels that courts should hesitate to exercise jurisdiction
in suits that seek the imposition of expensive or intrusive remedies on the
government. As Professor Fallon has explained, courts should avoid such
suits because of the costs to the government in conforming to court rulings
and because they involve the courts in the business of dictating policy to the
political branches.226 A corollary of that theory is that the judiciary should
be especially reluctant to award expensive or intrusive relief when the need
for that award is low.227 In such situations, the benefits of that award are
uncertain, but the costs are certain.
Indeed, as noted earlier, these concerns likely already play a role, albeit
an unmentioned one, in many of the Court’s standing decisions.228 They
explain better than current doctrine why the Court is willing to recognize
standing for some risks of harm but not others. But the way that the Court
has considered comity in these decisions is through Article III; when the
requested remedy may intrude too much on the other branches, the Court
has said that the claim does not present an Article III case or controversy.229
But the cost to the government is irrelevant to whether a dispute constitutes
a case over which a court has the power to exercise jurisdiction. Whether a
dispute constitutes a case depends on whether that dispute involves the
violation of rights for which the court can provide a remedy.230 The concern
about interfering with the other branches bears on whether a court should
exercise jurisdiction over an actual dispute, not whether it may. Thus,
comity should be a factor bearing not on whether a court has Article III
jurisdiction, but on whether the court should exercise that jurisdiction.231
C. Imminence
The imminence of an injury should also factor into a court’s decision
whether to hear a case. As noted earlier, the Court has said that the
imminence requirement is relevant to justiciability only to the extent that it

226
Fallon, supra note 7, at 648 (developing thesis that jurisdiction doctrines reflect concerns about
remedies).
227
Cf. Hessick, supra note 17, at 312 (arguing that the judiciary may be reluctant to award relief
when the “plaintiff would not materially benefit from a favorable decision”).
228
See supra notes 111–13 and accompanying text; see also Fallon, supra note 7, at 649–52
(gathering cases tending to show that jurisdiction doctrines reflect concerns about remedies).
229
See supra notes 111–13 and accompanying text.
230
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
231
Alexander Bickel usefully described this concept in terms of political capital. ALEXANDER M.
BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 116 (2d ed.
1986). Judicial decisions against other branches have effect only if those branches acquiesce in those
decisions. Id. Refusing to exercise jurisdiction allows the courts to avoid spending political capital on
particularly sensitive issues. Id. At the same time, however, courts may also expend capital by refusing
to hear cases that the other branches believe should be heard. Id.
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bears on whether a threat of injury is realistic.232 But imminence may serve
other roles. An imminence requirement may promote private resolution of
claims. Consider the situation where one individual presents a nonimminent
threat of injury to another individual. Because the harm is not imminent, the
individuals have time to try to resolve their dispute without judicial
intervention. Private resolution of claims would preserve judicial resources
and arguably could lead to more efficient outcomes.233
Requiring imminence of an injury also may promote comity. Even
when a remote harm is inevitable, another government body may still have
an opportunity to remedy that harm if the harm is not imminent. In that
situation, courts should be reluctant to intervene. This approach is
consistent with a variety of other prudential doctrines, such as exhaustion234
and abstention,235 which rest in part on this notion that courts should not
intervene when other bodies of government may redress the challenged
wrong.
Under this approach, courts should decline jurisdiction for
nonimminent harms, irrespective of whether the harm will inevitably occur
under the status quo, if another government body may provide relief. For
example, suppose a state university has an affirmative action program that
imposes an unconstitutional quota for admission, and that a five-year-old
white child seeks to challenge that program. Because he has a stake in that
claim, the child has Article III standing. But there is good reason for the
courts to refuse to exercise jurisdiction. That is because the child is not yet
in a position to apply to college, and in the next thirteen years, the political
branches may abolish the affirmative action program.236 If they do not, the
child can turn to the courts at that time.

232

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 565, n.2 (“Although ‘imminence’ is concededly a
somewhat elastic concept, it cannot be stretched beyond its purpose, which is to ensure that the alleged
injury is not too speculative for Article III purposes—that the injury is ‘certainly impending[]’ . . . .”
(quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990))).
233
Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Private Life of Public Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2029, 2079–81
(2005).
234
Courts require plaintiffs to exhaust their remedies before administrative agencies before
proceeding to court because it “giv[es] agencies the opportunity to correct their own errors, afford[s]
parties and courts the benefits of agencies’ expertise, [and] compil[es] a record adequate for judicial
review[.]” Avocados Plus Inc. v. Veneman, 370 F.3d 1243, 1247 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (third and fifth
alterations in original) (quoting Marine Mammal Conservancy, Inc. v. Dep’t of Agric., 134 F.3d 409,
414 (D.C. Cir. 1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Courts may excuse exhaustion when requiring
the parties to exhaust their administrative remedies would not fulfill these goals. Id.
235
Federal courts will abstain from ruling on the constitutionality of a state criminal statute at the
instigation of a plaintiff who is being prosecuted under that law because state officers have the principal
duty of implementing the state’s laws. See Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240, 243–44 (1926).
236
This concern underlies the Supreme Court’s decision in Lujan. There, as noted earlier, the Court
denied standing for a person who asserted intent to travel to Sri Lanka to view endangered animals
because the person did not specify that his trip to Sri Lanka was imminent. Lujan, 497 U.S. at 564. One
reason the Court gave for dismissing the case was that recognizing standing would interfere with the
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Applying this prudential approach would have led to a much more
nuanced decision in Massachusetts v. EPA.237 There, the Court found
standing for Massachusetts, which had challenged the EPA’s refusal to
issue a rule regulating emissions, based on the threat of loss of land from
rising sea levels due to global warming.238 Although acknowledging that the
harm would not occur for several decades, the Court explained that the
probability of harm without regulation of emissions was certain.239 But that
reasoning is too simplistic. The eventual certainty of harm is not
automatically a sufficient reason for the courts to intervene. Even if the
threat of harm under the current legal regime was certain, it was not certain
that regulations had to be enacted immediately to prevent those harms. The
political branches thus may have had adequate time to change the law to
redress the problem, in which case comity counseled against immediate
judicial intervention.
On the other hand, although it was not clear that immediate
intervention was necessary to prevent the future harm, one might argue that
the interest at stake—the possible destruction of the coastline—was too
large for the federal courts to abstain. These considerations should have
informed the Court’s decision whether the exercise of federal jurisdiction
was appropriate.240 A balance of these considerations may suggest that the
Court did come to the correct conclusion in finding standing, but got there
by taking the wrong path. Instead of focusing on whether there was a
sufficient likelihood of harm to create a “case” under Article III, the Court
should have asked whether the exercise of jurisdiction was appropriate.
D. Functional Concerns
In cases alleging a small risk of harm, courts should also consider
whether exercising jurisdiction is particularly likely to result in lower

President’s power under Article II to enforce the laws. Id. at 577. But this argument does not raise a
problem of low probability. Arguably, even if the probability that the plaintiff would visit Sri Lanka was
very high—for example, if the plaintiff had stated that returning to Sri Lanka was his principal goal in
life—the Court would have hesitated to grant standing because it would result in premature judicial
intervention into matters reserved to the President.
Courts should not intervene without evidence that the political branches did not have adequate time
to determine whether to take action and what course to take. Indeed, Professor Nash himself notes that
there should be severe limits on the doctrine because of separation-of-powers concerns of these sorts.
See Nash, supra note 7, at 522.
237
549 U.S. 497 (2007).
238
Id. at 514.
239
Id. at 523.
240
Of course, Congress or the EPA could refuse to take additional action to deal with global
warming. In that situation, a court could exercise jurisdiction over a future claim challenging the EPA’s
failure to develop regulations combating global warming. But the fact that Congress and the EPA
refused to take any additional action in the meantime may reflect Congress’s intent not to create
regulations targeting global warming and thus lead the court not to grant relief.
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quality decisions. Under our adversarial system, courts depend in large part
on the parties in resolving cases. The burden is on the parties to make
arguments and gather factual information relevant to deciding the case.
Ordinarily, the size of a plaintiff’s stake in a case is directly related to his
incentives to litigate effectively: the greater the stake, the more forceful the
litigation, and consequently the more aid that the plaintiff is likely to
provide the court in reaching its decision.241 Courts accordingly should be
more hesitant to exercise jurisdiction in a case in which the plaintiff has
only a small stake because he faces only a minute risk of injury. But courts
should not automatically deny standing in those cases. That is because the
size of the stake does not necessarily determine the forcefulness of a
plaintiff’s argument. An interest group seeking to enforce a principle
through litigation may pursue claims more vigorously than an individual
who actually suffers the type of harm that the interest group seeks to
prevent.242 That is because, although the group may not suffer injury, it
nevertheless has a strong interest in the way in which the case is resolved.
That said, it stands to reason that a person with a small stake in a case is
less likely to litigate a claim as forcefully as someone with a substantial
stake.
Small risks of injury may also undermine the quality of
decisionmaking by requiring courts to decide issues with an inadequate set
of facts. One reason for the injury-in-fact requirement is that it provides
factual context for a court’s decision, thereby increasing the chance of a
sound decision by making the court aware of the impact of its decision.243 A
claim based on a small threat of a future injury might provide inadequate
context for a decision if the reason for the low probability of harm is that
there is a possibility of intervening events that will change how the injury
will occur or the precise nature of the injury. These types of uncertainty
about an injury make it difficult for a court to tailor its decision to remedy
the harm in the least intrusive way.
241
Hessick, supra note 17, at 321; see also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) (stating that the
parties seeking to invoke the court’s jurisdiction must have “alleged such a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions”).
242
See Susan Bandes, The Idea of a Case, 42 STAN. L. REV. 227, 266 n.251 (1990); David M.
Driesen, Standing for *othing: The Paradox of Demanding Concrete Context for Formalist
Adjudication, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 808, 819 & n.77 (2004).
243
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Justiciability, Remedies, and Public Law Litigation: *otes on the
Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 14 (1984); Hessick, supra note 17, at 321; Gene R.
Nichol, Jr., Injury and the Disintegration of Article III, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1915, 1927 (1986)
(“Examination of these effects serves to fine tune the judicial decisionmaking process since abstract
rulings based on hypothetical impacts are more apt to be unwise ones.”); see also Valley Forge Christian
Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (noting that the
judicial standard for establishing standing “tends to assure that the legal questions presented to the court
will be resolved, not in the rarified atmosphere of a debating society, but in a concrete factual context
conducive to a realistic appreciation of the consequences of judicial action.”).
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Of course, not all low-probability injuries are attributable to changing
circumstances that may affect how a court writes its decision. An injury
may have a low probability of occurring, not because of potential
intervening events that affect the nature of the injury, but simply because it
is unlikely that the event will occur. An example is rolling a one on a
hundred-sided die. In that circumstance, the low probability of rolling a one
is not attributable to some potential intervening circumstances; it is simply
that there are many other possible outcomes. When the low probability of
injury is not due to an intervening event, the low probability does not affect
the court’s ability to predict the factual context of the injury. Consequently,
courts should be more willing to exercise jurisdiction. But when the reason
for the low probability of injury might affect the nature of the injury, courts
should be more hesitant.
A related problem arises when there is uncertainty about probability
itself. Unknown probability might have a significant impact on the quality
of decisionmaking. When the risk of injury is unknown, the judiciary may
not be able to assess intelligently the effects of awarding relief or the need
to adopt a doctrine preventing similar future threats.244 For example, if it is
uncertain whether a tire manufacturer’s conduct raises the risk of blowouts
and accidents, a court cannot rationally assess whether to adopt a rule
prohibiting that conduct. The uncertainty of the harm prevents the court
from knowing whether the prohibition is worth the costs it would impose on
the manufacturer.245
Of course, courts should not dismiss out of hand claims alleging
uncertain risks of harm. If a court knows that the probability of harm is high
but simply does not know how high, the court should exercise jurisdiction
244

To be sure, this uncertainty does not pose a direct problem in all cases in which it occurs. The
merits of most administrative law cases do not depend on the injury forming the basis for standing. See
Driesen, supra note 242, at 820 (illustrating this point through examples). But even in those cases, the
facts may present equitable concerns that influence the development of doctrine. See generally Frederick
Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883 (2006) (arguing that the facts of a case
influence legal development).
245
The Court’s decisions occasionally reflect this concern. See, e.g., Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312,
321–22 (1991) (finding unripe a challenge to a state law prohibiting political party endorsements for
nonpartisan office on the ground that the political parties had not alleged an intent to endorse a particular
candidate, and had not described “the nature of the endorsement, how it would be publicized, or the
precise language” that would be forbidden). Uncertainty of this sort often occurs in facial challenges to
statutes. Generally, a law is facially invalid only if there are no possible constitutional applications of the
law. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987). It is often not obvious whether a law has a
potential constitutional application before a case arises presenting that constitutional application. For
this reason, courts have dismissed facial challenges on the ground that they are not ripe. See Nat’l Park
Hospitality Ass’n v. Dep’t of the Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 810–11 (2003) (rejecting facial challenge to
regulation as unripe because regulation might have legal application in some cases). But cf. Nathaniel
Persily, Fig Leaves and Tea Leaves in the Supreme Court’s Recent Election Law Decisions, 2008 SUP.
CT. REV. 89, 96 (arguing that in some cases the Court has “conflat[ed] the as-applied/facial doctrine
with doctrines of ripeness” by upholding laws against facial challenges on the ground that “the true
extent of the constitutional burden remained unknown at the time of the litigation”).
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to award relief (if warranted on the merits) and fashion a doctrine to prevent
that injury.246
A separate pragmatic concern arising from extending standing to small
risks of injury is that the potential increase in caseload threatens to reduce
the quality of decisions and distract courts from considering the claims of
those individuals who most need relief. As noted earlier, there is reason to
think that the federal docket would not substantially grow under the anyrisk-of-harm standard.247 But if the dockets did grow, courts could
ameliorate the burden by confining jurisdiction to claims with a more
pressing need for resolution based on the prudential considerations
identified earlier. Doing so would allocate judicial resources to resolving
claims of individuals presenting the greatest need for relief. But this does
not mean that courts should never exercise jurisdiction for remote threats of
injury. Jurisdiction might be warranted if the threatened harm is extremely
severe, even if its risk of occurring is small or if the risk of harm is widely
shared and recurrent. In those situations, a decision would produce
substantial benefits warranting the use of judicial resources.248
CONCLUSION
The constitutionalization of the minimum-risk requirement for
jurisdiction confuses what courts ought not to do with what they cannot do.
Despite the Supreme Court’s protestations to the contrary, the size of the
likelihood of a threat occurring does not determine whether that threat
presents a case or controversy. Any potential threat of injury that the courts
can remedy creates a justiciable controversy and thus is sufficient to support
Article III standing.
To be sure, expanding Article III standing to plaintiffs who allege
small risks might not ultimately change many outcomes because those
plaintiffs are likely to lose on the merits of the claims.249 But that does not
mean that the current doctrine should be preserved. For one thing, the
minimum-risk requirement unjustifiably limits the power of the legislature
by shifting to the courts the constitutional authority to determine whether a
particular claim warrants judicial intervention. For another, the minimumrisk requirement threatens to muddle standing because of the imprecise
standards and insufficient information that courts employ in making risk
assessments. The result is an appearance that courts make standing
246

At least one court has dealt with uncertainty of injury simply by saying the uncertain increase in
risk did suffice for standing. See N.Y. Pub. Interest Research Grp. v. Whitman, 321 F.3d 316, 326 (2d
Cir. 2003) (finding standing based on uncertain increase in risk from pollution emissions).
247
See supra notes 194–98 and accompanying text.
248
Of course, Congress should have the power to override these concerns, given that it has
traditionally been the role of Congress and not the courts to determine the appropriate allocation of
judicial resources.
249
See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
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decisions based on personal biases or considerations other than merely the
size of risk.250
This is not to say that courts must exercise jurisdiction over all
individuals seeking redress for small risks of injury. One can justify
creating a framework under which courts have discretion to decline
jurisdiction in cases alleging a small risk of injury. But courts should
articulate their reasons for doing so by using more refined tools that
explicitly allow them to balance these concerns on a case-by-case basis
instead of relying on a blanket rule that the Constitution forbids the
adjudication of such claims. Doing so would promote transparency by
making explicit the fact that courts do often make standing determinations
based on these considerations. And it would facilitate a more coherent and
predictable law of standing, which would benefit litigants and all three
branches of government alike.

250

Cf. Tushnet, supra note 205, at 663 (arguing that standing determinations often reflect views
about the merits).
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